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Abstract
This thesis consists of four parts: in the first part, Judith Butler’s theory on 
subject and subjection is analyzed and interpreted within the framework of classical 
liberal tradition represented through the work of Isaiah Berlin, as well as within the 
anthropological and psychoanalytical thought of Mary Douglas and Julia Kristeva in 
order to outline the space for liberty within the world of socially constructed subjects.
Butler’s insights on socially constructed identities and possibility of freedom 
then serve as a ground for interpretation of three works of literature which are usually 
considered almost unapproachable: Samuel Becket’s Unnamable, David Albahari’s 
Koan o f the Story and Judita Salgo’s Road to Birobidzan. The aim is to demonstrate 
that some theoretical problems of interpretation of works of literature could be solved 
within the theoretical contexts that are broader than the context of literary criticism 
itself. For example, if  we are talking about the features of a narrator or other fictional 
characters, we implicitly or explicitly assume a whole set of definitions of what the 
person, self, or identity is. On the other hand, once we choose a broader theoretical 
framework, we ought to use all of those tools developed within literary theory for the 
purposes of interpretation. At the beginning of the chapter on Beckett’s The 
Unnamable it is said that we could not use “old-fashioned” tools to interpret 
twentieth-century fiction. However, at the end of that chapter it turns out that it is 
possible to interpret The Unnamable in terms of the “classical” knowledge of literary 
criticism and particularly within the genre framework of the novel of formation. It 
becomes possible to do this by choosing an appropriate, broader theoretical 
framework, in this case -  Butler’s theoretical discussion on the possibility of agency 
of social constructed subjects.
1. In t r o d u c in g  Te r m s
T h is  t h e s i s  has the following structure: in the first part I describe the 
theoretical framework within which, in the second and third part of the 
thesis, I interpret three works of literature -  a short sentence presented as a 
story, an unfinished novel presented as a complete work of literature, and 
another novel that is in literary criticism mainly presented as an anti-novel. 
Literary critics often consider these three works of literature as fiction that 
is nearly unapproachable for interpretation. My intention is to demonstrate 
that by choosing an appropriate theoretical framework, an interpreter can 
approach these works in an almost traditional way, that is, in a way 
traditional, realistic fiction is usually approached, although we are speaking 
about literature that is considered highly anti-traditional. On the other hand, 
the method I shall use to interpret these three works of literature is the same 
as the method I shall use to define the appropriate theoretical framework for 
my interpretations; This means that I try to place a highly groundbreaking 
theory within a rather traditional, humanistic-liberal context in order to 
emphasize some characteristics of a theory that could otherwise be 
neglected.
T h e  A m e r ic a n  p h i lo s o p h e r  and social anthropologist Judith Butler put 
forth the innovative theoretical view I am talking about. Against the idea
that feminist politics needs a firm notion of feminine identity, Butler argues 
that every identity is actually a social or cultural product. Developing the 
concept of the social construction of subjectivity, Butler also defines a 
world that is opposed to the world of socially constructed subjects and that 
is created simultaneously with and as the very condition of the existence of 
the latter. This other world, that Butler calls the “zone of uninhabitation,” is 
a domain of -  “abject beings:” And “abject beings” are those who are not 
recognized as subjects within the framework of the “law,” although the 
“law” produces them as well. In other words, “abject beings” are “marginal 
genders” that are excluded from the domain of subjects, that is, that are 
precluded from partaking in politics.
Yet, there is a sudden turn in this theoretical plot: although 
supposed to be invisible, “abject beings” emerge like “dread identification” 
as the very condition of. one’s being a subject, every time when one 
questions one’s own subjectivity. The political issue of recognition of 
“abject beings” as subjects who are legitimate members of a society is one 
of the main topics Butler theorizes within the framework of queer theory. 
Her elaboration of the concept of “the citation of the law” is meant to create 
a political space within which abject beings or marginal genders ought to be 
recognized as subjects. Through its three aspects -  performativity, 
reiteration, and abjection -  the concept, of “citation” opens a theoretical 
space within which Butler temporalizes the apparently eternal “law,” and 
thus creates the possibility of agency within the seemingly completely 
determined world of socially constructed subjects.
W r it in g  a b o u t  t h e  in h a b ita t io n  of the “zone of uninhabitation” I divide 
my thesis into three sections, plus one interlude. In the first chapter “Is 
There Freedom in the World of Socially Constructed Subjects,” through the 
comparison of Butler’s concept of agency with Isaiah Berlin’s famous two 
concepts of liberty, I give an account on what the zone of uninhabitation is; 
and, as it turns out, it is that inhabited by marginalized beings. In the 
chapter “The Hysteric versus the Hermeneutic Circle,” I construe Judita 
Salgo’s novel The Road to Birobidzan, whose main character is Anna O., 
the famous patient of the Viennese psychiatrist Joseph Breuer, as a story of 
the failed attempt of the formation of a new identity. In the chapter 
“Forming the Identity of the I-narrator in Samuel Beckett’s The 
Unnamable, ” I analyze Beckett’s novel in order to demonstrate the validity 
of Butler’s theorizing of possibility of agency. Butler’s theoretical insights 
on the subversion of identity serve as a suitable framework for an 
interpretation of Beckett’s novel, which is usually thought nearly 
unapproachable. Surprisingly, Butler’s discussion on the issue of identity 
allows me to construe Beckett’s novel in a rather traditional way. It is 
possible to say that Beckett’s novel, although it has been commonly 
regarded as a novel of all kinds of disintegration (of the story, of the 
characters, of the narrator, of the fictional time and space), could be read in 
a completely opposite way -  as a novel of formation. Beckett’s unnamable 
speaker and Salgo’s Anna O. can both be described as abject beings who 
are trying to establish themselves or to be recognized as subjects within 
their fictional worlds: Beckett’s “ protagonist” within his own zone of 
uninhabitability, and Salgo’s main character within the domain of
recognized subjects of her fictional world. Yet, while the unnamable. 
speaker’s effort can be considered successful, Salgo’s Anna O. fails to 
achieve recognition as à subject.
From the theoretical standpoint the first part of my thesis is of great 
importance. The validity of the whole thesis depends on a clear and sound 
definition of the zone of uninhabitation. On the one hand, I am trying to 
define it through the comparison of Berlin’s and Butler’s theories on 
political subjects and possibilities for their freedom, and, on the other, 
through the examination of the British anthropologist Mary Douglas’s and 
the French-Bulgarian theorist Julia Kristeva’s theories of the self. 
According to these, theories, it is possible to closely relate the zone of 
uninhabitation to the body itself. Furthermore, it is possible even to equate . 
the body and the territory of uninhabitation. To put it more precisely: it is 
. possible to demonstrate that the body is divided into two zones that actually 
fully overlap: the. zone of inhabitation and the zone of uninhabitation. The 
body itself, as well as the identity or the idea of the self, is the focus of 
severe political or cultural coercion that keeps society together and prevents 
it from falling apart. I would argue that the parts of the body that resist 
social constraints form the zone of uninhabitation, and, as Butler explains,. 
provide the possibility for agency, and hence, for political recognition of 
“abject beings.”
I find that Judita Salgo’s The Road to Birobidzan and Samuel 
Beckett’s The Unnamable -  the two novels that I take into consideration -  
in a certain way confirm Butler’s concept of “truly” subversive parody 
which enables “abject beings” to undermine the “law” in order to be
recognized as subjects by the same “law.” This confirmation is possible on 
the grounds of a clear analogy between the fictional world and the 
characters created within the frame of the narrative texts, On the one hand, 
and the so-called real world and subjects understood within the framework 
of the theories of “social constructivism,” on the other. In both cases 
fictional characters and real persons are seen as a kind of artificial 
construction.
In his book Literary Theory, which is actually his latest “very short 
introduction” to the subject (after the two more detailed introductions to 
structuralism and deconstruction), the British critic Jonathan Culler devotes 
a whole chapter to the issues of identity, identification and the subject. 
Culler affirms that “literature has always been concerned with questions 
about identity, and literary works sketch answers, implicitly or explicitly, to 
these questions” (Culler 2000: 106). “Literary works,” Culler continues, 
“offer a range of implicit models of how identity is formed” (Culler 2000: 
106). Furthermore: “Literature has not only made identity a theme; it has 
played a significant role in the construction of the identity of readers” 
(Culler 2000: 108). Even though he pays close attention to Judith Butler’s 
theoretical framework1 -  among other things, he stresses that “as Judith 
Butler explains, ‘the reconceptualization of identity as an effect, that is, as 
produced or generated opens up possibilities of ‘agency’ that are
1 It is very interesting that Caller devotes some ten pages to Judith Butler’s 
theoretical work in an overall introduction to literary theory that does not exceed 
a hundred pages. This is even more striking if we take into account that, on the 
one hand, Judith Butler is not a literary critic or theorist and, on the other, some 
important critics and theorists who contributed much to literary theory and 
criticism are not even mentioned in Culler’s Introduction.
insidiously foreclosed by positions that take identity categories as 
foundational and fixed’** (Culler 2000: 113) -  Culler fails to make a strong 
connection between “models of how identity is formed” within fictional 
worlds and how identity is “produced or generated” within the “world of 
socially constructed subjects.” He maintains that he perceives literature 
merely as a source of “rich materials for complicating political and 
sociological accounts of the role of such [political and sociological] factors 
in the construction of identity” (Culler 2000: 106). However, within the 
theoretical .framework of Judith Butler, literature could assume a much 
more important role.
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2. Is T h e r e  F r e e d o m  in  t h e  W o r ld  
o f  S o c i a l l y  C o n s t r u c t e d  S u b je c ts ?
i
In ms e s s a y  “Two Concepts of Liberty,” stressing that probably there is no 
need to demonstrate something that is so obviously true,, the liberal 
philosopher Isaiah Berlin asserts that “conceptions of freedom diirectly 
derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man” (Berlin 1969: 
134). However, although he gives and elaborates two precise definitions -  
positive and negative -  of liberty, Berlin does not engage in trying to define. 
“what constitutes a self, a person, a man,” or, one would say, eventually, a 
woman. Regarding different theoretical standpoints, this lack of a certain 
notion of a self could be seen as a weak spot in Berlin’s discussion on 
liberty that foregrounds his relativism, as well as, on the contrary, the sign 
of a philosopher’s deliberate avoidance of the metaphysical implications of 
such a concept that in fact strengthens his argumentation.
Berlin approaches two senses of liberty -  positive and negative -  
through answering the following two questions respectively: “What is the 
area within which the subject -  a person or group of persons is or should 
be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other 
persons?” and “What, or who, is the source of control or interference that 
can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” (Berlin 1969: 
121-2). It is not necessary to read these questions carefully to see why 
Berlin avoids defining the subject and why he maintains broad and vague
concepts of “his natural faculties” (Berlin 1969: 124; my italics) or “the 
essence of his human nature " (Berlin 1969: 126; my italics).
It is obvious that someone who would claim that Berlin’s concepts 
of liberty lack a firm ground because he does not define what “natural 
faculties” and “the essence of human nature” actually are, ought to argue 
that it is possible to say what the essence of human nature exactly is. 
Furthermore, not only should someone assert that this is possible, but it has 
often happened that people who “know” this “essence” think that this 
“knowledge” gives them the ultimate right -  to be precise, it happens fkom 
time to time that some of them think that it gives them the right -  to control 
or determine individuals as well as groups to do, or be, this (“the essence of 
human nature”) rather than that (a malformation of “the essence of humane 
nature”). And that is exactly what Berlin tries and manages to avoid by 
leaving the concepts of man’s “natural faculties” and “the essence of human 
nature” rather understated. “What is this essence? What are the standards 
which it entails?” Berlin asks, and then continues, “This has been, and 
perhaps always will be, a matter of infinite debate” (Berlin 1969: 126).
: Thus, one of the aspects of liberty implies that we “must preserve a 
minimum area of personal freedom” (Berlin 1969: 126), within which we 
can pursue, Berlin claims by quoting J. S. Mill, “our own good in our ownv 
way” (Berlin 1969: 127). In other words, Berlin argues that particularly 
. because it is “a matter of infinite debate,” we must preserve a minimum 
area of personal freedom within which one can be what one thinks that one 
has to be according to one’s own notion of the human essence.
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In a way, it could be said that Berlin's understanding of freedom 
partly relies on the fact that the debate on the essence of human nature is 
infinite, that is, that man’s “natural faculties” cannot be defined. This is 
how the American philosopher Richard. Rorty reads Berlin’s reading of 
Mill’s phrase “experiments in living”: in such an interpretation, the lack of 
a precise definition of a self, a person, a man, becomes the comer stone of 
Berlin’s defense of liberty “against telic conceptions of human perfection” 
(Rorty 1989: 45). However, this indeterminate notion of the subject exposes 
Berlin’s concepts of liberty to a more serious criticism.
To put it simply, Berlin’s concepts of liberty presuppose the 
existence of the subject “before the law”2 (one of the aspects of “negative 
liberty” is that one should be left to be what one is already able to be). 
Furthermore, this subject is already capable of doing something regardless 
of the “law” (the other aspect of “negative liberty” is that one should be left 
to do what one is already able to do). Finally -  and this is the whole concept 
of negative liberty -  the subject should be left to do or be what s/he is able 
to do or be within a certain area. Thus we have the subject before, therefore 
out of the “law,” and then the same subject within the framework of the 
“law” -  the “law” that should leave to a certain extent and in a certain area 
her or him to be what s/he was before and do what s/he did before. “Before” 
in this context should be related to the adjective “natural” and the noun.
2 This is Butler’s phrase. She uses “before the law” to allude to Derrida’s 
interpretation of Kafka’s story “Before the Law.” Further in the text I will use 
the word “law” in quotation marks to highlight that its meaning in this context 
cannot be reduced to the meaning of the strictly juridical term. Here its meaning 
should be much broader to encompass general meanings of words such as 
“language,” “symbolic order,” “discourse of power,” “thought style.”
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“nature.” That is, “before” is thought to foreground that the words “natural” 
and “nature” denote something that precedes the “law” and something that 
is exposed to the “law.” Therefore, “natural” and “nature” have to be 
understood in opposition to the “law.”
. thus we have the subject’s “natural faculties” and “human nature” 
that cannot be defined. At the same time, following Berlin, it is possible to 
claim that the subject’s “natural faculties” and “human nature” oppose and 
precede the “law.” indeterminacy of the subject’s “natural faculties” and 
“human nature” is the very condition for her or his liberty within the frame 
of the “law.” It turns out that Berlin’s concepts of liberty are grounded on 
two premises: first, that there is the subject before the “law;” and, second, 
that the subject cannot be defined. If this is the valid interpretation of 
Berlin’s writings, it seems that one question can challenge the whole 
structure of his concepts of liberty: Is there really a subject that precedes the 
“law”? What happens to liberty if the “law” in fact forms the subject? If the 
self is a creation of society do Berlin’s concepts of liberty make any sense?
II
S im ila r  q u e s t io n s  about Berlin’s thoughts on liberty could be posed from 
a slightly different standpoint, offered within the theoretical framework of 
the British anthropologist Mary Douglas. Although this is not a direct way 
to discuss these questions, it will help us to better understand Judith 
Butler’s theoretical insights, which will be discussed later.
12
•  3Writing about the idea of the self, Mary Douglas uses, again, 
Ludwik Fleck’s concept of “thought style.” Fleck argues, as Douglas 
explains, that in any community, or “thought-collective,” there is “a more 
or less disciplined, consensually agreed set of principles about how the 
world is, and what is a fact and what is speculation,” that Fleck calls 
“thought style” (Douglas 1992: 211). Fleck’s term “thought style,” as 
Douglas construes and develops it, dénotes a general framework of norms, 
and principles within which members of a community place their 
experience in order to interpret it and establish its meaning. Since thought 
style differs from one community to another, it is obvious that it is not 
universal or ultimate knowledge, although within a certain community it is 
usually manifested or represented as such. Therefore, it is. possible to say 
that it is not meant either to provide truth, or serve as a firm ground for the 
search of truth. Thought style can be viewed instead as a web of 
presumptions, principles, norms, and values, that keeps a certain 
community together, that is, prevents it from falling apart. In this way it 
becomes clear why every culture protects some of these presumptions, 
principles, norms, or values from questioning, by declaring that it is not 
possible to scrutinize them. “Such avoidance,” Douglas explains, “is known 
as taboo behavior” (Douglas 1992: 212).
3 In her book How Institutions Think, Douglas relies on Emile Durkheim’s and 
Ludwik Fleck’s theoretical insights in developing her own theory of socially . 
grounded cognition. Without going into details, it could be said that it is 
possible to make a parallel between Douglas's use of the term “thought style” 
and Butler's use of the “law.”
Fleck develops his concept of thought style by using examples from 
scientific communities. However, Douglas finds that Fleck’s thought 
collectives can be understood in a much broader sense. To exemplify this, 
Douglas uses , knowledge of or the broad consensus about the nature of the 
self and the person as “one of those areas of protected public ignorance” in 
“Western industrial culture” (Douglas 1992: 212). In other words, Douglas 
views Western society as a type of thought collective, and the notion of “the 
unitary, rational, once and for all embodied person”. (Douglas 1992: 211) as 
a matter that is protected from questioning within the framework of its own 
particular thought style. In other words, the idea of the self is tabooed by 
Western culture. “The case of maintaining that nothing can be argued about 
the self,” Douglas asserts, “is that the idea of the self is heavily locked into 
ideology” (Douglas 1992: 212). That is, “the idea of the self driven by self- 
regarding motives is undoubtedly an ideological and cultural construct” 
(Douglas 1992: 213). To demonstrate this, Douglas claims, one needs to 
“identify other self concepts, responding to other ideological demands, 
within a typology of possible ideologies” (Douglas .1992: 213). In her essay 
“Thought Style Exemplified,” Douglas provides such a concept of the self, 
and thus demonstrates her idea of Western culture as a thought collective, 
and the notion of the unitary, rational, once and for all embodied person as 
a taboo. Consequently, the thought style of Western culture is shown as 
neither universal nor ultimate. However, this provisional concept of the self 
will not be discussed here. What I am going to do is briefly retell Douglas’s 
account of what constitutes the taboo of the self in Western culture.
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However, this is not an easy task. Although it is taken for granted 
that we are talking about a “unitary, continuous, responsible self ’ (Douglas 
1992: 215), it turns out that we are actually talking about the “ineffable 
self’ (Douglas 1992: 215). An ineffable or unnamable self can be viewed as 
a product of a twofold process. On the one hand, the concept of the 
ineffable self is meant to prevent any definition of a person that is “apt to 
become an instrument of coercion” (Douglas 1992: 214). Discussing 
Berlin’s two concepts of freedom as an attempt of avoidance of such a . 
definition and its consequences, Douglas infers that Berlin deliberately 
empties the concept of the person. And that is exactly what we find on the 
other hand: the strategy of tabooing the notion of personhood by placing an 
inner self, the real person, beyond knowledge. Hence, there is a doomed 
attempt to avoid definitions in order to preserve the possibility of freedom 
for the self, since:
The idea of the ineffable self is j ust a blank space, a no-go area for logical 
discourse. It gives no entry for reasoning and no hold in rational debate 
against our own possible wishes to espouse arbitrary, coercive theories of 
selfhood and personhood. (Douglas 1992: 216)
And it turns out that “this idea of the self could be just as coercive as any 
other” (Douglas 1992: 214). Actually, it is coercive in a particular way. 
Douglas explains that over the past three hundred years, the notions'of the 
self and the pereon have been divided in the discourse of Western 
civilization:
15 .
The category of self has been classified as the subject, inherently 
unknowable. The category of person has been filled by the need to meet 
the forensic requirements of a law-abiding society and an effective, 
rational judicial system. (Douglas 1992: 214)
Following Douglas’s discussion, it could be said that the category of person 
has not only been filled by the need to meet forensic requirements: the 
category of person has also been filled by the need tô bè embodied. In other 
words, in order to meet the forensic requirements a “person” needs to have 
a “body.”
This demand imposes a non-negotiable link between the person and the 
person’s living body. Because of embodiment, we cannot claim to be able 
to be in three places, or two, at the same time. For the jury the capacities 
of the self have to conform to the accepted constraints of space and time. 
(Douglas 1992: 216)
This has several consequences. First, the concept of the multiple self is 
completely unacceptable, for “the jury room has no use for a concept of 
person with several constituent selves because responsibility must not be 
diffused” (Douglas 1992: 217). Further, the concept of the passive self 
cannot be accepted, which means that it is rather useless to excuse in court 
someone’s behavior as being influenced by : “furies, capricious gods, 
demons, personified emotions” (Douglas 1992: 217). If we are to accept
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such explanations, Douglas argues, it would “entail a great, deal of rewriting 
of the law-books” (Douglas 1992: 217). Even if we feel, to use Douglas’s 
words, “at the level of our gut response,” that there is something 
inappropriate about such a concept of personhood, we are disabled from 
saying that exactly because the idea of the inner self has been placed 
beyond the limits of knowledge and rational investigation (Douglas 1992: 
217). Thus, it turns out that “the idea of a unitary self, because it concords 
so well with our legal and economic institutions, exerts a stranglehold on 
public dialogue” (Douglas 1992; 217). Douglas’s account of this specific 
version of self, “unitary and fully embodied... [as] the cornerstone of our 
civil liberties, a block against arbitrary defamation,” makes one wonder 
how something metaphorically described as a stranglehold on public 
dialogue can at the same time be considered a cornerstone of our civil 
liberties . It is hardly consoling that this understanding of the self put an end 
to verdicts of witchcraft, an example Douglas uses to explain her account 
(Douglas 1992: 217).
Nonetheless, Douglas’s claims could be rephrased considering the 
importance of the body. It is possible to say that the idea of the unified body 
somehow precedes the idea of the unitary self. Since it is impossible to say 
anything about the self as such, we can form a notion of a unitary self only 
through a fully embodied self, which means only through an idea of the 
body. Therefore, because of their strong mutual dependence, it is possible 
to perform a metonymic replacement of the “unitary self’ with the “body” 
in the following way: The body, because it concords so well with our legal 
and economic institutions, exerts a stranglehold on public dialogue, just as
it is the cornerstone of our civil liberties, a block against arbitrary 
defamation, an armor which protects our emptied inner self.
Furthermore, if the “soul”, and the “body” are in a certain way 
mutually replaceable, it means that it is also possible to restate Douglas’s 
claims about the self as a construct of ideology in thé following way: The 
idea of the unified, organized body is undoubtedly an ideological and 
cultural construct. And: The idea of the body is heavily locked into 
ideology.4 Taking this into account, the questions asked about Berlin’s 
concepts of liberty and the subject could be reformulated in the following 
way: Is there really a body that precedes the “law”? What happens to liberty 
if the “law” in fact forms the body? If the body is a creation of the “law,” 
do Berlin’s concepts of liberty make any sense?
m
A ppro ac h ing  these  issu e s  from  a fem inist perspective, Judith Butler 
writes:
4 In her classical works Purity and Danger and Natural Symbols, Douglas opens a 
way for viewing the symbolic significance of the body as a metaphor of social. 
relations within a given community. Douglas follows Marcel Mauss when she . . 
claims that “the human body is always treated as an image of society and that 
there can be no natural way of considering the body that does not involve at the 
same time a social dimension” (Douglas 1996: 74). Furthermore, Douglas gave 
• an account on how the “social body,” the organization of community as a system 
of relations, performs a coercion on viewing and understanding the human body, 
and social behavior as well. And, the other way around, a particular perception 
,of the body constrains the perception of society (Barnard 1998: 75). Writing 
about the “two bodies” in Natural Symbols, Douglas argues:
The social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived. The physical 
experience of die body, always modified by the social categories through which 
it is known, sustains a particular view of society. There is a continual exchange 
of meanings between the two kinds of bodily experience so that each reinforces 
the categories of the other. As a result of this interaction the body itself is a 
highly restricted medium of expression. The forms it adopts in movement and 
repose express social pressures in manifold ways. (Douglas 1996: 69)
The prevailing assumption of the ontological integrity of the subject 
before the law might be understood as the contemporary trace of the state 
of nature hypothesis, that foundationalist fable constitutive of the 
juridical structure of classical liberalism. The performative invocation of 
a nonhistorical “before” becomes the foundational premise that 
guarantees a presocial ontology of persons who freely consent to be 
governed and, thereby, constitute the legitimacy of the social contract. 
(Butler 1990.: 3)
Like Berlin, Butler stresses that “the question of the subject is crucial for 
politics” (Butler 1990: 2); yet her reasons are quite different from Berlin’s. 
She claims that “juridical subjects are invariably produced through certain 
exclusionary practices that do not ‘show’ once the juridical structure of 
politics has been established” (Butler 1990: 2). However, at this point, one 
is tempted to demonstrate a certain similarity between Berlin’s and Butler’s 
stances, in spite of the apparent differences. Butler’s use of the terms 
“exclusionary practices” implies that there is something that can be 
excluded in the process of forming “juridical subjects.” It can be said that, 
in Butler’s terms, we have, on the one hand, “juridical subjects” and, on the 
other, something excluded -  something that we can define, in Berlin’s 
terms, as “natural subjects.” The argument can follow Rorty’s short 
examination of Foucault’s claim that “our imagination and will are so 
limited by the socialization we have received that we are unable even to
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propose an alternative to the society we have now” (Rorty 1989: 64). 
Underneath this claim Rorty finds that Foucault “still thinks in terms of 
something deep within human beings, which is deformed by acculturation,” 
although, on the other hand, he agrees that the human subject “is simply 
whatever acculturation makes of it” (Rorty 1989: 64). The key term in this 
discussion is obviously the “subject” again. And Butler can simply answer 
these objections by stating that she is speaking exactly about subjects that 
do not exist before and are produced by the “law.” There are no other 
subjects, apart from these. For something that is excluded we cannot use the 
term “subject,” because this term is already inscribed in a certain way.
Juridical power inevitably “produces” what it claims merely to represent; 
hence, politics must be concerned with this dual function of power: the 
juridical and the productive. In effect, the law produces and then conceals 
the notion “of the subject before the law” in order to invoke that 
discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise- that 
subsequently legitimates that law’s own regulatory hegemony. (Butler 
1990:2)
In other words, it is eventually possible to use the term “subject” to denote 
something or someone that is or who is excluded or not recognized as such 
by the “law,” but first we should stipulate the term’s new meaning. 
However, Butler is inclined to use the terms “abject beings” or “marginal 
genders” for those excluded by the “law” rather than to define a new 
meaning for the term “subject,” because any new definition of the term
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could imply that it is possible to have a subject who escapes or is excluded 
by the productive and regulatory hegemony of the “law,” Eventually, 
Butler’s final argument that there is nothing that precedes the “law,” could 
be taken to mean that what is excluded by “exclusionary practices” is at the 
same time produced by the “law” itself.
Considering the concept of a socially constructed subject, what can 
we say about liberty? Can we rely on Berlin’s discussion of the two 
concepts of liberty in such a context? It is possible to say that Berlin’s 
definition of liberty does not work within this context. In Butler’s terms, it 
does not make sense to say that one should be left to do or be what one is 
able to do or be, if social constraints are already imposed on “one” in order 
to make “one” out of one or whatever. “One” comes to being through or is 
made by the “law,” hence “one” is able to be or do only what one is 
supposed to be or do.
Berlin would probably say that such a view is a kind of 
determinism, and he would be partly right. In fact, it would be unfair to say 
that Berlin was not aware of such a criticism. In his essay “Political Ideas in 
the Twentieth Century,” he writes about “a new concept of the society”:
There is one and only one direction in which a given aggregate of 
individuals is conceived to be traveling, driven thither by quasi-occult 
impersonal forces, such as their class structure, or their collective 
..unconscious, or their racial origin, or the ‘real’ social or physical roots of 
this or that ‘popular’ or ‘group’ ‘mythology’. The direction is alterable, 
but only by tampering with the hidden cause of behavior -  those who
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wish to tamper being, according to this view, free to a limited degree to 
. determine their own direction and that of others not by the increase of 
rationality and by argument addressed to it, but by having a superior 
understanding of the machinery of social behavior . and skill in 
manipulating it. (Berlin 1969: 32)
Berlin’s arguments against such a determinism are rather expected: quoting 
St.-Simon’s prophecy he points out that “the government of man will be 
replaced by the administration of things” (Berlin 1969: 33). The word 
“ thing,” denoting something that is artificial, reveals that Berlin rejects such 
a view because it is directly against one’s “natural faculties” and the 
“essence of human nature”5 Berlin underlines the great possibility that 
someone who holds such a view will be inclined to use violence to change 
an existing order. Thus, there are two steps in his argument against this 
concept. The first concerns “the essence of human nature,” and the second 
the use of violence. However, there is no direct casual connection between 
the concept of socially determined subjects and the tendency to violence. 
Furthermore, there is no firm connection between the concept of socially 
determined subjects and determinism^ though “the controversy over the 
meaning of construction appears to founder on the conventional 
philosophical polarity between free will and determinism” (Butler 1990: 8). 
In other words, there is a space for liberty even in theories of the social 
construction of subjectivity. Yet, liberty, according to such theories, cannot
5 Butler would probably claim that Berlin’s “natural” and “nature” are “denoting a 
universal capacity for reason, moral deliberation, or language” (Butler 1990:
10).
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be achieved through subjects’ wider representation because this 
representation has an ironic consequence, which is unavoidable if we take 
into account“ the constitutive powers of their own representational claims’’ 
(Butler 1990: 4). Butler explains that “the articulation of an identity within 
available cultural terms instates a definition that forecloses in advance the 
emergence of new identity concepts in and through politically engaged 
actions” (Butler 1990: 15). In other words, requests for wider representation 
as well as requests for being accepted as a new subject, that is, a subject 
different from recognized ones, must fail because there is nû possibility of 
emergence and recognition of a new identity within the framework of the 
existing “law.” A new identity cannot be recognized and therefore cannot 
be represented as a subject.
IV
IN her  tw o  BOOKS, Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter, Butler 
provides a ground for establishing a concept of liberty that is quite different 
from Berlin’s. This difference can be explained by taking into account 
Butler’s shift in the debate from the political issues in the narrower sense, 
discussed by Berlin, to the issues of subject and identity. Her focus bn the 
subject is a logical consequence of hers, as well as Berlin’s, point that the 
question of the subject is a crucial one for politics. Furthermore it seems 
that that is the only possible way to explain how political engagement and, 
particularly, claims for political rights and freedom make sense in a world 
of socially constructed subjects. It is possible to say that Butler steps into
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the area that Berlin defines as a space where the subject should be left to 
do, or be, what s/he is able to do, or be. To put it in Douglas’s terms, Butler 
steps into a forbidden or tabooed area of a “protected” self. While Berlin is 
concerned with protecting this area as a space of freedom within a broader 
political space of coercion, Butler wants to see whether there is freedom in 
this area at all. It is obvious that this area is a space where subjects become 
candidates for taking part in the political life of a community. But it is also 
obvious, although Berlin tries to avoid such a view by leaving “human 
essence” undefined, that being a subject, according to theories of social 
constructivism, already implies the imposition of social and political 
constraints. The question is how one can make room for freedom by 
theorizing socially constructed subjects.
Butler starts with the claim that “obviously, the political task is not 
to refuse representational politics,” and proceeds:
The juridical structures of language and politics constitute the 
contemporary field of power; hence, there is no position outside this field, 
but only a critical genealogy of its own legitimating practices. (Butler 
1990: 5)
Thus, “the task is to formulate within this constituted frame a critique of the 
categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, 
naturalize, and immobilize,” and to trace “what qualifies as the juridical 
subject” (Butler 1990: 5). Then the second step is to deconstruct the 
assumption “that ah identity must first be in place in order for political
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interests to be elaborated and, subsequently, political action to be taken” 
(Butler 1990: 142). Butler emphasizes that “there need not be a ‘doer 
behind the deed’“ (Butler 1990: 142). It is wrong to associate “agency” with 
“the viability of. the ‘subject,’ where the ‘subject’ is understood to have 
some stable existence prior to the cultural field that it negotiates” (Butler 
1990: 142). On the contrary, “the. reconceptualization of identity as an 
effect, that is, as produced or generated, opens up possibilities of ‘agency’ 
that are insidiously foreclosed by positions that take identity categories as 
foundational and fixed” (Butler 1990: 147).
Butler refuses to compromise: she rejects the. possibility that a 
culturally constructed subject could be vested with agency, which is to be 
its cognitive ability independent of its cultural determination. Butler 
highlights that according to this view, such a subject is “mired,” rather than 
fully constituted by the “culture” and “discourse,” and explains that “this 
move to qualify and enmire the preexisting subject has appeared necessary 
to establish a point of agency that is not fully determined by that culture and 
discourse” (Butler 1990: 143). However,,
[...] this kind of reasoning falsely presumes (a) agency can only be 
established through recourse to a prediscursive “I,” even if that ‘T  is 
found in the midst of a discursive convergence, and (b) that to be 
constituted by discourse is to be determined by discourse, where 
determination foreclose die possibility of agency. (Butler 1990: 143)
25
Butler points out the difference between the concepts of “being constituted” 
and “being determined” by discourse:
Indeed, when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that 
the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that 
govern the intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not 
• determined by the rules through which it is generated because 
signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of 
repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through 
the production of substantializing effects. (Butler 1990: 145)
It is clear now why it is so important for Butler’s theoretical fescue of the 
possibility of agency that there be no preexisting subject, a doer before and 
behind a deed. The subject is an effect of constant repetition of the rules 
and, ‘“agency,* then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on 
that repetition” (Butler 1990: 145). In Gender Trouble, Butler suggests that 
practices of parody can serve to reveal the way in which culture and 
discourse constitute the subject through the repetition of rules. Butler uses 
the rhetorical term to denote the practice that should help us disclose how 
the subject is made by the “law”: since parody is a technique of laying bare 
the device, or, in other words, a deliberate disclosure of basic discursive 
techniques, it seems that Butler’s critique of the production of identity and 
its categories has to lay bare those basic discursive techniques of forming 
subjects, in order to demonstrate that there is no ontological ground for 
being a human subject.
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Practices of parody can serve to reengage and reconsolidate the very 
distinction between a privileged and naturalized gender configuration and 
one that appears as derived, phantasmatic, and mimetic -  a failed copy, as 
it were. [...] Hence, there is a subversive laughter in the pastiche-effect of 
parodie practices in which the original, the authentic, and the real are 
themselves constituted as effects. (Butler 1990: 146)
One is tempted to ask: how can this kind of criticism or parody change 
something? If we are aware of these discursive techniques, it does not mean 
that we can change them. There is no compulsory logical sequence in which 
an awareness of something is followed by a possibility that it can be 
changed. The awareness is obviously a necessary condition, but it is not a 
sufficient one for a deliberate change. Indeed, Butler investigates a 
theoretical and political space within which those who have been excluded 
could be recognized as subjects. And she is fully aware that “[...] surely 
parody has been used to further a politics of despair, one which affirms a 
seemingly inevitable exclusion of marginal genders from the territory of the 
natural and real" (Butler 1990: 146). However, she claims that there is “a 
subversive laughter in the pastiche effect of parodie practices in which the 
original, the authentic, and the real are themselves constituted as effects.” 
Furthermore, Butler argues that the critical task is to disclose the strategies 
of repetition and make them subversive. These discursive strategies imply 
the possibility of contestation and subversion of identities, since identities 
are not pre-given, but produced through the discourse. Eventually, this
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subversive repetition. ought to deprive the hegemonic culture of the 
possibility to speak of naturalized or essentialist gender identities.
Yet, does this denial mean that marginal genders are finally enabled 
to acquire an identity and become subjects recognized by the “law”? If this . 
is the meaning of Butler’s argument, it seems, according to her own theory, 
that by deploying parodie strategies marginal genders pass through the 
process of the subjection to the “law” in which they lose their marginal 
features, “because the articulation of an identity within available cultural 
terms instates a definition that forecloses in advance the emergence of new 
identity concepts.”
This is exactly what Berlin writes about. He states that the 
recognition of our own claim to be fully independent human beings 
depends on its recognition by others.
For what I am is, in large part, determined by what I feel and think; arid 
what I feel and think is determined by the feeling and thought prevailing 
in the society to which I belong, of which, in Burke’s sense, I form not an 
isolable atom, but an ingredient (to use a perilous but indispensable 
metaphor) in a social pattern. I may feel unfree in the sense of not being 
recognized as a self-governing individual human being... (Berlin 1969: 
157)
However, it is not clear, even in Berlin’s terms, how one can be an 
independent and self -governing subject if one has to be recognized by 
others as such a subject in order to become such a subject. And what are the
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terms of recognition? Probably, one has to feel and think in accordance 
with the feeling and thought that prevail in the society to which one 
belongs. Likewise, Butler’s “marginal genders” will be invisible, hence 
unfree, until they become recognized as “human beings” by others, and they 
will be recognized when their feelings and thoughts become similar to or 
the same as the prevailing ones. It seems that Berlin does not consider this a 
problem. As far as Butler’s Gender Trouble is concerned, it seems that she 
does not succeed completely to preserve the theoretical possibility of 
marginal genders to be recognized as subjects and to rescue the concept of 
agency through the implementation of parodying strategies. A few years 
later, Butler poses the question that sounds like a comment on her. first 
book:
What do we make of a resistance that can only undermine, but which 
appears to have no power to rearticulate the terms, the symbolic terms -  
to use Lacanian parlance -  by which subjects are constituted, by which 
subjection is installed in the very formation of the subject? (Butler 1997:
M)
V
The AUTHORESS of Gender Trouble is not the only one who finds herself in 
such a vicious circle. A similar, case can be found in Toril Moi’s 
interpretation of Julia Kristeva’s work:
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. If the Kristevan subject is always already in the symbolic order, how can 
. such an implacably authoritarian, phallocentric structure be broken up? It 
obviously cannot happen through a straightforward rejection of the 
symbolic order, since such a total failure to enter into human relations 
would, in Lacanian terms, make us psychotic. We have to accept our 
position as already inserted into an order that precedes us and from which 
there is no escape. There is no other space from which we can speak: if 
we are able to speak at all, it will have to be within the framework of 
symbolic language. (Moi 1985: 170)
Like Bütler, Kristeva also does not want to accept the final conclusion of 
such premises: that there is no opportunity for resistance. Therefore she 
creates the concept of the “revolutionary subject”:
[...] a subject that is able to allow the jouissance of semiotic motility to 
disrupt the strict symbolic order. The example par exèllance of this kind 
of ‘revolutionary* activity is to be found in the writings of late-nirieteenth 
century avant-garde, poets like Lautréamont and Mallarmé, or modernist 
writers such as Joyce. (Moi .1985: 170)
One more solution of a similar kind is suggested by Richard Rorty, who 
develops the concept of a “strong poet.” There is an interesting analogy 
between Kristeva’s “revolutionary subjects” and Rorty’s “strong poets.’ In 
Rorty’s term, a strong poet is a person “who uses words, as they have never
5 Rorty’s “strong poet” is in fact a reworked concept that was originally developed 
by the American literary critic and historian Harold Bloom.
before been used” (Rorty 1989: 28). A strong poet is capable of creating 
metaphors, and “when a metaphor is created it does not express something 
which previously existed, although, of course, it is caused by something 
that has previously existed” (Rorty 1989: 36).
The same goes for Kristeva’s “revolutionary subjects” and for 
Butler’s “marginal genders”: the very moment a revolutionary subject is 
accepted and understood as a poet, s/he becomes an element of the 
symbolic order. One would expect Kristeva to be aware of this, since she 
relies heavily on the work, of both Mikhail Bakhtin and Russian formalists. 
Bakhtin and the formalists foreground the ambivalence of parody as well as 
of other literary devices that distort or lay bare existing literary and 
linguistic patterns. By laying bare a device, the technique of parody distorts 
and, at the same time, renews, reestablishes, reinforces an. existing pattern. 
Like any other literary device, parody is impossible outside of an existing 
literary order; hence the very possibility of parody is a structural element of 
the system. The same goes for metaphors:
Metaphors are unfamiliar uses of old words, but such uses are possible 
only against the background of other old words being used in old familiar 
ways. A language which was “all metaphor” would be a language which 
had no use, hence not a language but just a babble. For even if we agree 
that languages are-not media of representation or expression, they will 
remain media of communication, tools for social interaction, ways of 
tying oneself up with other human beings. (Rorty 1989: 41)
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Similarly, in Bodies that Matter Butler explains why it is impossible for the 
subject to resist norms through the occupation of a space that is not 
. encompassed by the “law”:
The paradox of subjectivation (assujetissement) is precisely that the 
subject who would resist such norms is itself enabled, if not produced, by 
such norms. Although this constitutive constraint does not foreclose the 
possibility of agency, it does locate agency as a reiterative or 
rearticulatory practice, immanent to power, and not a relation of external 
opposition to power. (Butler 1993:15)
At first sight, parody seems like a dead-end in Butler’s theoretical efforts to 
rescue possibilities of agency in Gender Trouble. What Butler says about 
Kristeva’s notion of disruption of the “law” could also be said about 
Butler’s elaboration of parody in Gender Trouble', her (kristeva’s) strategy 
of subversion “proves doubtful” (Butler 1990: 80). Butler is quite aware of 
this:
Parody by itself is not subversive, and there must be a way to understand 
what makes certain kinds of parodie repetitions effectively disruptive, 
truly troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated and 
recirculated as instruments of cultural hegemony. (Butler 1990: 139)
Yet, in Gender Trouble Butler does not develop fully the concept of a truly
troubling parody: her implicit understanding of the “law” as a static, never
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changing structure prevents her from achieving the set goal. In Gender 
Trouble she views the position of a subject as already inserted into a pre­
given and unchangeable order from which there is no escape. In her next 
book Bodies that Matter, she finds a theoretical way out by developing 
Foucault’s concept of the “law” as a discursive structure that is in a 
continuous process of change: “To recast the symbolic as capable of this 
kind of resignification, it will be necessary to think of the symbolic as the 
temporalized regulation of signification, and not as a quasi-permanent 
structure” (Butler 1993: 23).
vi
Tms c h a n g e  is not unexpected if we take into account one of the main 
characteristics of Butler’s work -  she is keen on deconstructing every 
binary opposition that is presented as natural, eternal, essential, 
metaphysical. She deconstructs these oppositions by showing that they are 
established within the framework of a certain discourse and that they cannot 
exist outside that framework. Every binary opposition is also a hierarchical 
one. This means that one part of the opposition is in a certain way 
submitted to the other part. The point is, as Judith Butler successfully 
demonstrates, that there are no two parts in a binary opposition, but only 
one, which dominates the hierarchical structure. The other part is produced 
by the discourse as a kind of ontological, metaphysical, essential ground 
that justifies the domination of the first one. Thus, unlike the French 
philosopher of deconstruction Jacques Derrida, who mainly turns
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hierarchical oppositions upside down and thus. actually preserves the 
existing structure of power, Butler undermines it by reducing binary 
oppositions to the one element only. Examples of such oppositions are 
culture and nature, gender and sex, acculturated subject and natural subject. 
For example, Butler explains that in the sex/gender distinction sex is 
referred : to. as something that precedes gender, while it is actually a 
construction offered within language, “as that which is prior to language, 
prior to construction” (Butler 1993: 5). Apparent opposition between the 
“law" and the subject is of the same kind. That is, the subject is a product of 
a discourse that has to justify the domination of the “law” within the 
hierarchical binary structure of the “foundationalist fable constitutive of the 
juridical structure of classical liberalism.” The same goes for the term 
“construction” itself. Although “construction” is seen as something that the 
subject is inevitably exposed to, Butler argues:
And here it would be no more right to claim that the term “construction” 
belongs at the grammatical site of the subject, for construction is neither a 
subject nor its act, but a process of reiteration by which both “subjects” 
and “acts” come to appear at all. There is no power that acts, but only a 
reiterated acting that is power in its persistence and instability. (Butler 
1993:9)
7 Here I have in mind John Ellis’ critique of Derrida’s interpretation of Saussure’s 
linguistics, and, particularly, of his deconstruction of the so-called •
, “logocentrism.” See Ellis 1989: 18-66.
Making the existence of the “law” dependent on repetition -  both subjects 
and the “law” appear simultaneously through the process of reiteration -  
Butler temporalizes the “law.” The process of reiteration is possible only if 
we understand “construction” as “temporalized regulation”: “construction 
not only takes place in time, but is itself a temporal process which operates 
through the reiteration of norms” (Butler 1993: 10).* The same goes for the 
symbolic law, for which Butler claims, after Nietzsche’s critiqué of the 
notion of God, that “the power attributed to this prior and ideal power is 
derived and deflected from the attribution itself’ (Butler 1993: 14). 
Interpreting Lacan’s notion of the access to the symbolic law as a kind of
“citing” the “law,” Butler finds it possible to oppose the presumption that
< •
the symbolic law “enjoys à separable ontology prior and autonomous to its 
assumption” by the notion that “the citation of the law is the very 
mechanism of its production and articulation” (Butler 1993: 15). The 
“citation” is also a kind of “temporalized. regulation” -  “a temporal process 
which operates through the reiteration of norms.”
Butler defines three aspects of the “citing”: preformativity, 
reiteration, and abjection.
8 In his account of Mary Douglas’s description of latent groups, offered in her 
book How Institutions Think, Richard Pardon, among other things, writes:
On Douglas’s account, a functionalist argument basically requires two elements. 
One is the idea of circularity: behavioural patterns exist that sustain a pattern of 
collective organization, which in turn reproduces the same behavioural patterns, 
which in turn sustain the collective organization -  and so on, and so on. In other 
words, a functionalist argument requires a causal loop that explains the 
persistence o f patterns o f  activity that tends to stabilize the matrix responsible 
for generating them. The second criterion of a functionalist argument is that this 
casual loop goes unrecognized by the social agents who make it happen. 
(Pardon 1999: 230)
It seems to me that there is a clear analogy betw een D ouglas’s “unrecognized 
causal loop” and Butler’s concept of reiteration.
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In the first instance, performativity must be understood not as a singular 
or deliberate “act,” but, rather, as the reiterative and citatiohal practice by 
which discourse produces the effects that it names. (Butler 1993: 2)
This explanation of performativity is rather different from John Austin’s 
definition of the successful performative that includes certain conditions 
that have to be fulfilled, and it is in accordance with Derrida’s 
interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, of Austin’s linguistic theory. In 
Butler’s terms, performativity itself sets the conditions through the 
performative act. For example, “regulatory norms of ‘sex’,” Butler writes, 
‘Svork in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, 
more specifically, to materialize the body’s sex, to materialize sexual 
difference” (Butler 1993: 2). Performativity is, also, “always a reiteration of 
a norm or set of norms” (Butler 1993: 12). Actually, it becomes effective, 
that is, gains power through reiteration. The power of the performative is 
not the function of an origination, but is “always derivative” (Butler 1993: 
13). Reiteration of a norm is also â process of exclusion:
This exclusionary matrix by which subjects âré formed thus requires the 
simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are not 
yet “subjects,” but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the 
subject. [...] This zone of uninhabitability will constitute the defining 
limit of the subject’s domain; it will constitute that site of dread 
identification against w hich — and by virtue of which — the domain of the
c
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subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to life. (Butler 
1993:3)
Thus, one becomes the subject through the perfomative act, which becomes 
effective through the process of reiteration and is determined, by abjection. 
The .question is: “If performativity is construed as the power of discourse to 
produce effects through reiteration, how are we to understand the limits of 
such production, the constraints under which such production occurs?” 
(Butler 1993: 20). In other words, is there any space for freedom in this 
concept?
One could determine this area of freedom or agency as the very 
“zone of uninhabitability.” As Butler emphasizes, this zone is at the same 
time outside and inside the subject:
In this sense, then, the subject is constituted through the force of 
exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the 
subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, “inside” the subject as its 
own founding repudiation. (Bütler 1993: 3)
This is the reason why we can view this “outside” not only as something 
that “permanently resists discursive , elaboration,” but, at the same time, as 
“a variable boundary set and reset by specific political investments” (Butler 
1993: 20). This changeable boundary, which cannot be grasped and defined 
by the discourse, frames the space in which new identities can emerge. And 
since it is changeable and dependent on specific political investments it
makes space for agency within the framework of practical political issues. 
Only in this regard, does Butler’s use of parody actually become effective. 
By laying bare already established procedures of forming subjects it is 
possible to change them, since they have to be reiterated to become 
effective! By refusing to reiterate them as they are already established, 
“marginal genders” can succeed in being accepted as subjects who can take 
part in politics, and thus are able to argue for their rights.
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A c c o r d i n g  t o  B u t l e r ,  whenever a subject questions its subjectivity, 
abject beings emerge as dread identifications. A dread identification is 
actually frightening in a particular way. It is dreaded because it cannot be 
accepted as a new identity, hence given a status of the subject within the 
framework of the “law,” Therefore the subject is forced to accept a 
subjectivity offered within the range of allowed identifications. If the 
subject passes through the process of questioning by confirmation of its 
previous subjectivity, it means that “citation” was successful. However, 
what happens if the subject chooses the identity of an abject being? 
Furthermore, what happens if this abject being wants to regain the status of 
the subject within the framework of the “law”? In her essay “Subjection, 
Resistance, Resignification,” Butler asks:
How does the process of subjectivation, the disciplinary production of the 
subject, break down [...]? Whence does that failure emerge, and what are 
its consequences? (Butler 1997: 95)
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In order to answer these questions Butler discusses the Althusserian notion 
of interpellation. The French philosopher Louis Althusser believed that a 
subject is formed through the performative processes of addressing, 
naming. He argued that social demand in fact produced the subjects it 
named. However, there is always a possibility that something goes wrong 
and causes misidentification: “If one misrecognizes that effort to produce 
the subject, the production itself falters” (Butler 1997: 95). Here we have a 
case similar to those cases that Austin used to ' call unsuccessful 
performative acts. Implicitly Butler admits that performativity itself is not 
enough for producing subjects. There are some conditions that should also 
be fulfilled: for example, the condition of correct recognition. However, in 
this discussion Butler is not concerned with performativity itself. She is 
looking for the possibility of producing new identities. Therefore she 
continues to analyze these possible cases of misrecognition as an 
opportunity for new identities to emerge. Althusser placed the possibilities 
of misrecognition info the domain of the imaginary, and that directs 
Butler’s examination to the following conclusion:
The imaginary thwarts the efficacy of the symbolic law but cannot turn. 
back upon the law, demanding or effecting its reformulation. In this sense, 
psychic resistance thwarts the law in its effects, but cannot redirect the 
law or its effects. Resistance is thus located in a domain that is virtually 
powerless to alter the law that it opposes. Hence, psychic resistance 
presumes thé continuation of the law in its anterior, symbolic form and, in
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that sense, contributes to its status quo. In such a view, resistance appears 
doomed to perpetual defeat. (Butler 1997: 98)
Therefore we face again the same questions: How can these new identities 
be recognized by the “law”? What makes resistance to the law possible? 
Moreover, where does this need to be identified as “dread” come from? 
And where does the possibility of agency of abject beings come from?
At the beginning of her essay “Subjection, Resistance, 
Resignification ”. Butler repeats after Foucault that “this process of 
subjectivation takes place centrally through the body” (Butler 1997: 83). 
The self is constituted through the production of the body. The subject can
emerge only “at the expense of the body” (Butler 1997: 91). Hence Butler
: '■ 
tries to examine the “body” itself in order to find a place of resistance. This
is not surprising at all: we have already seen that the body can be given an
important role when the idea of the self is discussed. Furthermore, in the
analysis of Mary Douglas’s essay on the idea of the self it became clear that
in a certain context the self and the body are mutually replaceable, although
in her exemplification of thought style, Douglas does not follow this
direction. However, a number of other theorists, especially feminist
thinkers, do.
“The various theorists,” the Australian feminist philosopher 
Elizabeth Grosz writes, “have helped make explicit the claim that the body, 
as much as the psyche or the subject, can be regarded as a cultural and 
historical product” (Grosz 1994: 187). In her Volatile Bodies, Grosz 
distinguishes two major groups of feminist theorists who consider the body
a social construct. On the one hand we have those whom Grosz calls 
constructionists, for whom “the distinction between the ‘real’ biological 
body and the body as object of representation is a fundamental 
presumption” (Grosz 1994: 17). They do not question the superseding of 
the biological body or its functions: “the task is to give them different 
meanings arid values” (Grosz 1994: 17).
Correlatively there is a presumption of a base/superstructure model in 
which biology provides a self-contained “natural” base and ideology 
provides a dependent parasitic “second story” which can be added -  or 
not -  leaving the base more or less as it is. (Grosz 1994: 17)
On the other side Grosz finds theorists of “sexual difference,” those for 
whom “the body is no longer understood as an ahistorical, biologically 
given, acultural object” (Grosz 1994: 18). They theorize “the lived body, 
the body insofar as it is represented and used in specific ways in particular 
cultures” (Grosz 1994: 18).
For them, the body is neither brute nor passive but is interwoven with and 
constitutive of systems of meaning, signification, and representation. On 
the one hand it is a signifying and signified body; on the other, it is an 
object of systems of social coercion, legal inscription, and sexual and 
economic exchange. (Grosz 1994: 18)
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The difference between these two groups is not so obvious. It is possible to 
say that, at the level of social or cultural inscription and codification of the 
body, the difference is rather insignificant. What is at stake is the body 
itself. The former understand the body as “an inert, passive, noncultural and 
ahistorical term”; according to the latter, “the body may be seen as [...] the 
site of contestation, in a series of economic, political, sexual, and 
intellectual struggles” (Grosz 1994: 19).
Still, it is not clear how it is possible to view the body às a site of 
contestation. A number of questions can be posed: What kind of 
contestation? Who or what is struggling? What is the struggle about? Is the 
body just the site of the conflict or one of the parties involved in the 
conflict?
VIII
L e t  u s  s t a r t ,  once again, from a new beginning. In her book Purity and 
Danger, Mary Douglas argues against the sharp distinction between so 
called primitive religions and the great religions of the world. She 
undertakes “to vindicate the so-called primitives from the charge of having 
a different logic or method of thinking” (Douglas 1992: 3). She; claims that 
it is not possible to demonstrate that modems “follow a line of reasoning 
from effects back to material causes,” while “primitives follow a line from 
misfortune to spiritual beings” (Douglas 1992: 3). Both primitives and 
modems follow the same logic that can be comprehended as a “concern to 
protect society from behavior that will wreck it” (Douglas 1992: 4). In other
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words, this logic could be explained as “ thought style,” namely, as “a 
creative movement, an attempt to relate form to function, to make unity of 
experience” (Douglas 1988: 2)..
Unity of experience is created, as Douglas demonstrates in Purity 
and Danger, through rituals of purity and impurity (Douglas 1988: 2). 
These rituals establish symbolic patterns within and by which “disparate 
elements are related and disparate experience is given meaning” (Douglas 
1988: 3). Ideas of impurity are also effective in the following ways: on the 
one hand as a means by which members of a certain society try to influence 
one another’s behavior, and, on the other, as dangers that protect society by 
threatening transgressors. Pollution ideas can thus be viewed as the means 
. through which certain norms and values are established as a system that 
gives meaning to experience, as well as a system of protection that ought to 
prevent a society’s malfunction.
Douglas explains that there is no society that is all-encompassing or 
completely independent of its surroundings, therefore every society is 
exposed to external pressure, “that which is not with it, part of it and 
subject to its law, is potentially against it” (Douglas 1988: 4). Therefore an 
area around a border and the border itself are of high risk, that is, highly 
tabooed. Furthermore, according to Douglas, every society is established on 
a hostile territory:
For I believe that ideas about separating, purifying, demarcating and 
punishing transgressions have as their main function to impose system on 
an inherently untidy experience. It is only by exaggerating the difference
between within and without, about and below, male and female, with and 
against, that a semblance of order is created. (Douglas 1988: 4)
In other words, Douglas claims that the creation of an order is possible only 
through forming strong hierarchical binary oppositions. An inherently 
• untidy experience thus denotes an experience which is equivocal, uncertain, 
undecidable, and in order to avoid “a chaos of shifting impressions,” each 
of us seeks to construct “a stable world in which objects have recognizable 
shapes, are located in depth, and have permanence” (Douglas 1988: 37), 
that is, a world of univocal, decidable meanings. It is possible for us to 
make such a world because "our interests are governed by a pattern-making 
tendency, sometimes called schema" (Douglas 1988: 37). Anything that 
does not fit into an established schema violates that order and ought to be 
seen as a matter out of place, or dirt. However, the very notion of dirt 
implies a system of defined relations, as well as an opposition to that 
system, which means that dirt is somehow, an element of it: "Where there is 
dirt there is system” (Douglas 1988: 36). Therefore pollution could be 
viewed as one element of the general binary opposition, the other element 
being order. Does this mean that pollution is created by order as the very 
condition of its existence? And how is this related to those questions 
concerning the body?
It is possible to say that an element is missing in Douglas’s 
examination of rituals of purity and impurity. She does not explain how is it 
that we have the capacity to respond to purity and impurity. How is it that 
we view the idea of impurity as. something dangerous and threatening, so
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that it can be used to protect an established order from transgression? 
Where does our capacity for disgust come from? Why are we afraid of the 
chaos of shifting impressions and seek to place ourselves within a stable 
world of binary oppositions, in which objects have recognizable shapes, are 
located in depth, and have permanence?
In her book Powers o f Horror, Julia Kristeva claims that Mary 
Douglas seems to view the human body as the “ultimate cause of the socio­
economic causality” (Kristeva 1982: 66), where “socio-economic causality” 
in Douglas’s terms could be understood as an Older.  ^ However, although 
Kristeva maintains that Douglas provides a sound explanation for the 
establishment of order by drawing attention to the human body, this claim 
seems like an overinterpretation. Rather Grosz is right when she states that 
Kristeva shifts Douglas’s work on pollution and defilement from “a 
sociological and anthropological into a psychological and subjective 
register” (Grosz 1994: 193). In a way Kristeva is aware of this when she 
objects that Douglas “naively rejects” Freudian premises at the moment, 
when “a concern to integrate Freudian data as semantic values connected 
with the psychosomatic functioning of the speaking subject” emerges in her 
thinking (Kristeva 1982: 66). Therefore it is possible to say that while she
. 9 In her essay “Self-evidence,” opening with a quotation from Hume, Douglas 
makes the firm connection between causality and an universe of principles or 
order:
Over two hundred years ago David Hume declared that there is no necessity in 
Nature: ‘Necessity is something.that exists in the mind, not in objects.’ In other 
words, he insisted that knowledge o f causality is of the intuitional kind, guts 
knowledge; causality is no more than a ‘construction upon past experience’; it is 
due to ,‘force of habit’, a part of human nature whose study, he averred, is too 
much neglected. As anthropologists our work has been precisely to study this 
habit which constructs for each society its special universe of efficacious 
principles. (Douglas 1999: 252)
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speaks about Douglas, Kristeva actually speaks about herself, that is, about 
her intention to view the human body as the ultimate cause of socio­
economic causality. In other words, Kristeva explains the establishment of 
order by taking into account the psychosomatic functioning of the speaking 
subject. Kristeva poses the hypothesis that “a social (symbolic) system 
corresponds to a specific structuration of the speaking subject in the 
symbolic order” (Kristeva 1982: 67).10 This means that Kristeva assumes 
that the symbolic system and the speaking subject are similarly structured. 
Furthermore, this means that it is possible to explain the formation of the 
human body as a web of psychosomatic functions through an analogy with 
the creation of order. Finally, this means that in order to describe the 
formation of the human body, one can rely heavily on “the fundamental 
work of Mary Douglas” (Kristeva 1982: 65). However, it is also possible to 
say that by shifting the discussion into a psychological and subjective 
register, Kristeva provides an appropriate framework for Douglas’s study 
on defilement, that is, on the establishment of order, and gives the answer 
to the question where our capacity for disgust comes from.
Kristeva replaces Douglas’s term “defilement” by the French word 
“1’abjection.” In an interview on feminism and psychoanalysis, Kristeva 
undertakes to explain its meaning:
L 'abjection is something that disgusts you, for example, you see 
something rotting and you want to vomit -  it is an extremely strong 
feeling that is at once somatic and symbolic, which is above all a revolt
10 The symbolic order in this context could be understood as a thought style.
against an external menace from which one wants to distance oneself, but 
of which one has the impression that it may menace us from the inside. 
The relation to abjection is finally rooted in the combat that every human 
being cames on with the mother. For in order to become autonomous, it is 
necessary that one cut the instinctual dyad of the mother and the child and 
that one become something other. (Kristeva 1996: 118)
According to this explanation, something that is abject causes at the same 
time strong bodily as well as symbolic responses that Can be understood as 
an extreme reaction against the threat that comes from the outside, and, as it 
turns out, from the inside as well. And the example of the abject thing is 
“something rotting/’ How are we to understand this? Something that is 
rotting is something that loses its shape, thus something that cannot be 
clearly defined. As something that is undecidable it violates oppositions 
established within the order, thus jeopardizing the order itself by turning us 
toward the chaos of shifting, impressions. Therefore there is a strong 
symbolic response against this external menace. However, what about the 
menace from the inside and the somatic reaction? This is obviously related 
to the combat that every human being carries on with the mother in order to 
become an autonomous, subject. Thus we step into the space of the chora.
It is possible to say that Kristeva’s term “chora” encompasses 
Douglas’s “chaos of shifting impressions.” At the same time Kristeva’s 
term unifies concepts of society and its surroundings separated and opposed 
to each other in Douglas’s theory. This is a very important theoretical step
47
towards Butler’s theory in which there is no point external to the “law.” 
Kristeva takes this concept from Plato and redefines it in a way that Toril 
Moi describes as follows: it is “neither sign nor a position, but ‘a wholly 
provisional articulation that is essentially mobile and constituted of 
movements and their ephemeral stases’” (Moi 1990: 161). To establish 
meaning, a chaotic continuum must be split. Splitting the chora enables the 
subject, as Toril Moi explains in her essay on Kristeva, “to attribute 
differences and thus signification to what was the ceaseless heterogeneity of 
the chora" (Moi 1990: 162). Nevertheless, this'attribution is possible only 
after the “mirror stage.” This means that the chora also denotes the 
instinctual dyad of the mother and the child that needs to be cut if one is to 
become something other. In the “mirror phase” one recognizes one’s own 
image in a mirror as one’s first self-image. Stabilization of one’s identity is 
finished when one becomes capable of pronouncing sentences that conform 
to the rules, that is, to the “law.” The point is that one’s first self-image is 
exaictly the image of its own body. The moment when one becomes able to 
distinguish one’s own body is the moment when one is enabled to enter the 
symbolic order. But that is also the moment of the formation of the domain 
of abjection. The first image of one’s self is not stable, the image of the 
body is not the real one. It is only an image. Therefore, anything that can 
violate its unstable shape has to be rejected, placed into the domain of 
abjection. Kristeva describes the human body as “the prototype of that 
translucid being constituted by society as symbolic system” (Kristeva 1982: 
66). Consequently, we can describe the abjected parts of the body as the 
dark or dirty side of the “translucid being.”
It is possible now to make an analogy between Kristeva’s 
description of forming the human body and Douglas’s description of
establishing an order: Elizabeth Grosz elaborates this as follows:
-
Relying heavily on Mary Douglas’s innovative text Purity and Danger, 
Kristeva asks about the conditions under which the clean and proper 
body, the obedient, law-abiding, social body, emerges, the cost of its 
emergence, which she designates by the term.abjection, and the functions 
that demarcating a clean and proper body for the social subject have in 
the transmission and production of specific body types. The abject is what 
Of the. body falls away from it while remaining irreducible to the 
subject/object and inside/outside oppositions. The abject necessarily 
partakes of both polarized terms but cannot be clearly identified with 
either. (Grosz 1994: 192)
We can also relate Kristeva’s concept of the chora to Douglas’s idea of an 
inherently untidy experience. The contrast between the chora and the 
symbolic order could be compared to the distinction between the chaos of 
shifting impressions on the one hand and the clear division between purity 
and impurity on the other. Splitting the chora resembles the process of 
defilement through which purity and impurity are defined. Therefore it is 
possible to conclude that order is established and structured like the human 
body, as well as the other way around, that the human body is established 
and structured like order. As Kristeva suggests, we can leave out “questions 
of cause and effect,” that is, whether the social is determined by the
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subjective, or if it is the other way around (Kristeva 1982: 67). Yet, within 
the theoretical context of Butler’s writings it seems that there is no doubt 
that the subject is formed by the “law” through the formation of the body. 
Furthermore, this relation between the body and the order is of great 
importance in another way: those parts of the body that are the objects of 
defilement provide a ground for resistance and change.11 The body thus 
becomes a site of conflict between two tendencies: one that tries to preserve 
the existing order, and the other that strives to change it. Moreover, the 
body is not just a site; it is at the sarne time a cause of the conflict.
There is one more question that should be asked. Even if we locate 
the source of resistance in the “law,” we still have to explain how this 
resistance can be successful. This is the question that Judith Butler tries to 
answer in her essay “Subjection, Resistance, Resignification.” In this essay 
Butler repeats her main assumptions about the subject who cannot be 
produced in his/her totality through immediate subjectivation. S/he is, 
instead, in a permanent process of its own being produced. S/he is not
11 But it seems that something cannot be changed: the very pattern of binary 
opposition. Writing about “the dilemma of identity,” Amber Ault points put 
that a pattern of exclusion or defilement can be traced throughout a society. 
Even marginalized groups abjected by the dominant group, Ault explains, 
“construct the boundaries of their identities and, as a result, have begun to 
explicate processes both counter-intuitive to us as social and political actors 
and predictable to us as sociologists: marginalized, stigmatized, and deviant 
groups themselves engage in their own processes of stigmatization” (Ault 1996: 
311). It could be said that we find ourselves in a vicious circle of binary 
oppositions at any level of a society or within patterns of identity of individual 
subjects or groups. It seems that the establishment of any kind of identity 
demands certain exclusion of something else. And if that something is to be 
recognized, something else must be excluded again. However, the question 
whether it is possible to avoid these binary patterns of the establishment of 
order, the body, and the self, misses the point. These binary patterns actually 
permanently provide conditions for agency, change, and the emergence of new 
identities.
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reproduced repeatedly; s/he is produced in repetition. This repetition 
prevents the dissociated unity, the subject, from consolidation and 
normalization. Yet, although this repetition can undermine the rules of 
producing subjects, it does not mean that it can change them. Neither does 
the failure of the “law” at “the level of the psyche” (Butler 1997: 98). 
Psychic resistance can never displace or reformulate the “law.” The only 
source of power within Butler’s theoretical work is power itself, that is, the 
“law” itself, and therefore only the “law” has enough power to undermine 
itself. And it can do that through its own investment in the body, since, as 
we have seen, the body is the site of the greatest investment of the power of 
the “law.” The other word for this investment is “sexuality.” Sexuality 
“provides productive contradiction in terms” that enables Butler to create a 
space for successful resistance:
If the very process of subj ect-formation, however, requires a preemption 
of sexuality, a founding prohibition that prohibits a certain desire but 
itself becomes a focus of desire, then a subject is formed through the 
prohibition of sexuality, a prohibition that at the same time forms this 
sexuality -  and the subject who is said to bear it. [...] In this sense, a 
“sexual identity” is a productive contradiction in terms, for identity is 
formed through a prohibition on some dimension of the very sexuality it 
is said to bear, and sexuality, when it is tied to identity, is always in some 
sense undercutting itself. (Butler 1997: 103-104)
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This prohibited, or abjected, sexuality that emerges through the prohibition 
itself, causes injurious interpellations or defilement, which “could also be 
the site of radical reoccupation and resignification”. This process of 
resignification could be viewed in terms of productive contradiction again.
'i .
Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and because I hâve 
a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain 
.. narcissism takes hold of any term that confers existence, I am led to 
embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially. [...] 
As a further paradox, then, only by occupying -  being occupied by -  that, 
injurious term can I resist and oppose it, recasting the power that 
constitutes me as the power I oppose. (Butler 1997: 104)
It seems after all that the possibility of agency is the consequence of a 
malfunction of the “law.” Nevertheless, it is the only logical conclusion 
within the sequence of Butler’s assumptions. As already said, her method of 
deconstruction of binary oppositions is to reduce them to one of the two 
elements, namely the one that dominates the hierarchical opposition. Thus, 
it is not surprising that in any binary opposition whose one element is 
power, the other element is to be eliminated through Butler’s deconstructive 
way of reasoning. On the other hand, it is also expected that the “law” as an 
emanation of supreme power cannot be opposed effectively by anything but 
itself. However, it seems that in her essay on subjection, resistance, and 
resignification, Butler leaves room for a conclusion that there must be 
something else, apart from the "law,” something that helps, or causes the
malfunction of power -  the body itself, or, as Judith Butler likes to put it, 
"bodies that matter." ,<
*  *  *
I f  w e  ARE to summarize the relations between the methaporical phrase 
“zone of uninhabitation,” the body, the "law,” and the possibility of agency, 
or between theories of Judith Butler, Julia Kristeva, Mary Douglas, and, 
eventually, Isaiah Berlin, the following issues ought to be pointed out. 
Driven by . her political engagement in the fight for the legal rights of 
marginal genders (a struggle that is completely in accordance with the 
classical liberal tradition and values that Berlin argues for), Butler 
theoretically produces the concept of citation of the “law” in order to open 
the way for effective political action. By assuming that the "law” is an 
emanation of supreme power that can bê opposed only from within its own 
operational framework, Butler needs to (a) temporalize the “law,” and (b) 
make it dependent on its own effects. She manages to achieve these 
theoretical goals by developing the concept of citation through its three 
aspects: perforinativity, reiteration, and abjection.
It is obvious that the third aspect -  abjection -  is of greatest 
importance considering the salvation of the possibility of agency within the 
framework of the theories of social constructivism. According to Butler’s 
theory, abject beings as well as recognized subjects are repeatedly and 
simultaneously produced through the same performative act of the “law”; 
therefore, there is nothing that precedes the “law.” If we are to find weak
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spots in Butler’s theory, I am inclined to argue that this is one of them. A 
thorough examination of Butler’s assumptions points out that, eventually, 
she maintains the distinction between the real biological body and the social 
body, the body as it is represented and used in specific ways (I cannot see 
another way of understanding Butler’s phrase “a founding prohibition that 
prohibits a certain desire”).12 Therefore I felt a need to introduce Julia 
Kristeva’s theoretical insights in my work. Kristeva developed the concept 
of abjection through its relation to the body, and within Kristeva’s theory it 
is possible to equate the. body with- the methaporical phrase “zone of 
uninhabitation.” On the other hand, Butler’s use of the term “law” has some 
mystical connotations and therefore it seemed to me that it would be of 
some help if I introduce the term “thought style,” construed and developed 
by Mary Douglas, as an equivalent of Butler’s “law.”
This is the theoretical framework within which I try to interpret two 
particular works of literature. These interpretations have a double goal. On 
the one hand, they are intended to be a kind of additional proof for the 
theoretical assumptions and insights examined in this chapter. On the other 
hand, they are intended to demonstrate that some theoretical issues, viewed 
as problems within the narrower framework of literary criticism, could be 
approached, explained and resolved within broader theoretical contexts, and
12 It is interesting that my conclusion about Butler’s theoretical views concerning 
the body is exactly the same as Butler’s conclusion about Foucault’s theoretical 
insights. Namely, in her early essay about the paradox of the body in Foucault’s 
History of Sexuality. Vol. /, Butler wrote that, although Foucault maintains that 
the body is literally produced by discursive power, there are some metaphors in 
. his writings that suggest that he assumed that there is a body before the “law,” 
the body that precedes and opposes the “law.”
in this particular case -  within the context of Judith Butler’s theorizing on 
subject and identity.
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3. A n  In t e r l u d e :
“If  I RAISE A HAND... WHERE WELL MY HAND 
GO?”
The title of this ^interlude” is, in façt, almost the whole story that I am 
going to analyze here. The complete story, written by the Serbian-Jewish 
writer David Albahari, goes like this:
If I raise a hand, he said, where will my hand go? (David Albahari, Fras u 
supi, Beograd: Rad, 1984, p. 56)
. The title of the story is “The Koan of the Story.” That is all.
Many questions, of course, can be asked about this short text by 
Albahari. Obviously one might begin by asking: Is this really a story? What 
makes it a story? What is it about? What happens in it (the question related 
to the common and, one would say, valid assumption that in every story 
something should happen)? What does it mean? How can it be interpreted? 
In other words: What can one do with this short sentence that the author 
presents as a story? Or, to put it another way: What does this short sentence 
presented as a story do?
The last question makes it obvious that I intend to approach 
Albahari’s text from a more precisely defined standpoint -  the particular 
standpoint of the reader as defined in the theory of “reader response
criticism.” Thus, it seems that I shall try to answer the following questions: 
How does this sentence make me think that it is the story? Moreover, how 
does it make me think it is a good story worth analyzing? Partly relying on 
the interpretative procedure established by Stanley Fish, I will try to answer 
these questions, but before I begin to analyze the story I am going to 
explain in what way , I shall use the interpretative method established by 
“reader response criticism.”
Stanley Fish’s interpretative theory Can be divided in two parts. 
First, Fish defines the conditions of communication and understanding. We 
communicate, according to Fish, not because we “share a language, in the 
sense of knowing the meanings of individual words and the rules of 
combining them, but because a way of thinking, a form of life, shares us, 
and implicates us in a world of already-in-place-objects, purposes, goals, 
procedures, values, and so on; and it is to the features of that world that any 
words we utter will be heard as necessarily referring” (Fish 1980: 303-4). 
As members of a so-called “interpretative community” we speak. Fish 
claims, “from within a set of interests and concerns, and it is in relation to 
those interests and concerns” that we can assume that we will understand 
each other (Fish 1980: 303).
The very process of interpretation and understanding of texts Fish 
grounds in his explanation of the process of reading:
In an utterance , of any length, there is a point at which the reader has 
taken in only the first word, and then the second, and then the third, and 
so on, and the report of what happens to the reader is always a report of
what has happened to that point. (The report includes the reader’s set 
toward future experiences, but not those experiences.)13
This means that the reader understands the word or the words she or he has. 
already read by trying to guess what will come next in the text; Although it 
will often turn out that the reader’s surmises are false, they still remain part 
of the meaning of the text. In other words, the. sequence of the reader’s 
mostly false surmises actually constitutes the meaning of the text.
However, as M. H. Abrams demonstrates in his essay “How to Do 
Things with Texts,”14 one has to follow Fish’s instructions only to a certain 
extent in order to establish a relevant -  one would say valid -  interpretation. 
Abrams argues that Fish himself reads in a way slightly different from the 
one he actually prescribes. That is, Fish’s procedure of construing th e . 
meaning of the text is always preceded by the previous reading of the whole 
text and it is grounded in his knowledge relevant for the understanding of 
the chosen text. In other words, Abrams foregrounds that the choice of the 
points in the text where Fish stops to guess what will come next shows that 
he already has certain notions, about the. whole text and that that is the 
reason why he manages to choose exactly those points that are really 
relevant for the already, although tacitly, established meaning of the text.
In the following paragraphs I am going to construe “The. Koan of 
the Story” by using Fish’s “start-stop strategy,” in a way that Fish himself,
13 Quoted from Abrams 1991: 282-3.
14 M. H. Abrams “How to do Things with the Texts," in Doing Things with texts, 
edited by Michael Fischer (New York, 1989).
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as Abrams describes, actually uses it, thus taking into account some of the 
possible surmises and particularly emphasizing the existing tension 
between false guesses and the final meaning of the story. I am also going to 
contextualize the story to demonstrate how its meaning or significance can 
be changed according to different contexts, or, to use Fish’s terms, “ways of 
thinking” or “forms of life” that form “interpretative communities.”
I
T h e  s t o r y , to  say  it  aga in , goes lik e  th is:
David Albahari . ..
“The Koan of the Story”
If I raise a hand, he said, where will my hand go?
First: the. author
■ D a v id  A l b a h a r i  is one of the best Serbian writers of short stories. He is 
especially well known for his extremely short stories. Thus, a reader 
familiar with Serbian fiction would not be surprised to find a one-line-story 
under the name of David Albahari. Furthermore, Albahari’s fiction can be 
described as a good example of the stream in contemporary Serbian 
narrative literature that is often called “postmodernist fiction,” or 
“metafiction.” Among other things (as far as Serbian literature is concerned, 
“other” in this context implies certain very negative connotations and 
values if it comes from so-called conservative critics), these labels mean
that it is fiction written by authors very well aware of theoretical and poetic 
issues in writing and reading literature. In the case of David Albahari this is 
confirmed by Albahari’s many essays and interviews on the poetics of short 
stories. Thus, noticing Albahari’s name above the story, the reader can 
suppose that there is a good reason why Albahari presents one short 
sentence as the complete story.
Second: the title
T h e  r e a d e r  associates the first term in the title -  "koan” -  with a very 
specific genre and tradition of Zen. Thus, it is possible to read the first word 
of the story’s title as an explicit instruction about how to read the rest of the 
story. The koan is “a nonsensical or paradoxical question posed to a Zen 
student as a subject for meditation, intended to help the student break free 
of reason and develop intuition in order to achieve enlightenment” 
(Random House Webster’s Dictionary). However, the reader will be 
surprised by the next word of the title -  “story.” The term “story” has the 
same fimction as the term “koan.” It is also the name of a specific genre 
with its own tradition. In a way, the reader is told to read the sentence as a 
koan as well as a story. The problem is that the meanings of these two 
terms are mutually exclusive in a certain way. A koan is definitely not a 
story, and, the other way around, one would say that any text pretending to 
be a story must consist of more than one simple question (to put it simply, it 
should have à beginning, a middle, and an end).
Furthermore, the connection between the two words in the title is 
ambivalent, because of the various meanings of the preposition “of* which
relate the two words to each other. On the one hand, it is possible to say 
that the content of the story will be “a nonsensical or paradoxical question,” 
that is, the question is placed within the story as a part of it. On the other 
hand, we can understand the relations between the words in the title as a 
comment on the story as a koan, that is, the story as such is a kind of a 
riddle posed to the reader. The title suggests that the whole story is in a way 
“nonsensical, and paradoxical,” considering the common notion of what a 
story should be, which implies that the reader should break free of the usual 
meaning of the term “story” in order to understand the text in a proper way. 
Thus, one can say that in the title we can find the trace of an unstable 
hierarchy: at the same time the word “kôan” is in a way subordinated to the 
word “story,” and, the other way around, the “story” is subordinated to the 
“koan,” All these meanings have to be taken into account when construing 
the story.
Third: the story - '
B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  t e r m  “koan” the reader will not be surprised by the 
question: “If I raise a hand... where will my hand go?” The title prepares 
the reader for this question -  for the “nonsensical and paradoxical 
question.” However, when considering only the “koan,” the middle part of 
the sentence -  “he said” -  is completely redundant. If the koan is a genre 
defined as the question posed to the student by the Zen teacher, it is not 
necessary to add “he said.” Yet, again, this is not only the koan, this is, at 
the same time, the story, and that is the reason why one can ask the
following questions: Who is “he”? Why “said” instead of, for example, 
“asked”? “Said” to whom: student, himself, psychiatrist, reader?
“He said” is the break in the sentence. It divides the sentence into 
two parts. The first part of the sentence -  “If I raise a hand...” -  is 
completely understandable in a way that nothing strange happens. We can 
ask, of course, many questions, such as: Who is ‘T ’? Where is “I”? Whom 
does “I” talk to? -  but those questions are ordinary, and we can ask them 
almost every time we start to read a story. Then, after the first half of thé 
question there is a pause, and then comes a complete change of the situation 
-  "... where will my hand go?” In the first part it looks as if the hand is a 
part of the speaker’s body, and that he can control his limbs: it seems this is 
the only way we can understand the first part of “I”‘s conditional utterance 
about “raising a hand.” On the contrary, in the last part it seems he cannot 
control his body and that if he moves he will fall apart. It looks like this 
change occurs during the pause of “he said.” “He” implies that there is a. 
certain kind of identity of the T* or the speaker. At least the speaker is not
y
“she,” but “he.” However, in the last part of the sentence this identity is 
challenged as soon as it is established. This challenging of the speaker’s 
identity is emphasized by the word “my.” In the first part we have just “a 
hand.” It is implied that it is the speaker’s hand. But in the last part a kind 
of process of disintegration is suggested by treating the hand as an 
autonomous subject that can move independently of the speaker’s will and 
intention,, and this -  speaker’s uncertainty about his own body -  is 
underlined by his need to say “my hand.” In fact, it is not obvious any more
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that it is really his hand, as we have presupposed when reading the first part 
of the sentence.
We can conclude that at the same time when the speaker’s identity 
is established by the pronoun “he,” the process of “his” disintegration and 
loss, of identity begins. And this is the elementary “plot” of the story. This is 
what happens in the story. And the narrator tells us this story by using the 
koan -  the nonsensical and paradoxical question. And s/he tells us this story 
in a way that is also nonsensical and paradoxical, that is, in a way which 
challenges the usual notions of story-telling, as well as of the narrator.
n
I t  is  p o s s ib l e  to say that this story on both levels -  on the level of the 
question and on the level of the story -  challenges our notions of certainty 
and identity. Here, one could ask why I think it is possible to understand 
this story in this way. The answer is: I read it within particular contexts.
First of all, I am thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s book On 
Certainty as an appropriate ground for understanding “ The Koan of the 
Story.” The opening sentence of Wittgenstein’s book is:
1. If you do know that here is one hand, we’U grant you all the rest. 
(Wittgenstein 1969: 7)
By this sentence Wittgenstein challenges G. E. Moore’s “defense of 
common sense” based on the assumptions that he knows some propositions 
for sure, such as “Here is one hand, and here is another.” Wittgenstein
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claims that there is no significant difference between “knowing” and “being
. . . . "  -  • • "
certain” and points out that being certain is, in fact, a matter of appropriate 
usage of language. “I may be sure of something,” Wittgenstein writes, “but 
still know what test might convince me of error” (Wittgenstein 1969: 66). 
However, if the procedure of testing is not established in language, and we 
still know that something is wrong, that puts in question all our beliefs.
68. Could we imagine a man who keeps on making mistakes where we 
regard a mistake is ruled out, and in fact never encounter one? 
(Wittgenstein 1969: 75)
[...]
70. For months I have lived at address A, I have read the name of the 
street and the number of the house countless times, have received 
countless letters here and given countless people the address. If I am 
wrong about it, the mistake is hardly less than if I were (wrongly) to 
believe I was writing Chinese and not German.
71. If my friend were to imagine one day that he had been living for a 
long time past in such and such a place, etc. etc., I should not call this 
a mistake, but rather, a mental disturbance, perhaps a transient one. 
(Wittgenstein 1969: 75)
The point is that we can imagine that someone can be wrong in a way that 
Wittgenstein describes, but then not know how to cope with if because 
language does not provide appropriate tools for such circumstances. 
Therefore, we can ask: does the following question make any sense within 
the existing language order;
9. Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand 
-m y own hand, that is? (Wittgenstein 1969: 13)
And the answer would be that it probably does not make sense, but we can 
still imagine the situation in which we can ask such a question. This 
question’s meaning is parallel to the meaning of the question in Albahari’s 
story. It is nonsensical and paradoxical exactly because it is out of the usual 
order and common sense established by language usage. It is also 
interesting to notice parallelism between the uses of “my” in both 
questions. The point is that if such questions do not make sense in the 
existing language order, does it mean that they do not make sense at all? 
We can say that they lead the reader to the linguistic border: they are . 
verbalized within a language (that is the only way, after all), but their 
meaning cannot be defined within this same language. To demonstrate this,, 
it is enough to ask: What does it mean that someone does not know where 
her or his hand would go if s/he raises it? What does it mean that a hand 
can go (independently)?
m
H o w e v e r , it is possible to say that such a questioning of certainty does not 
jeopardize the notion of identity. Yet, Wittgenstein writes that
4. “I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the 
sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be
. taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human.” (Wittgenstein 
1969:7)
Thus, knowing that I am a human being implies, at least, that I have the 
organs of a human. Furthermore, one can say that it implies that I have 
organs organized as the organism. Finally, it implies that I can control my 
organs, at least my limbs, since they are organized into an organism in a 
certain way. Talking about the need. for establishing the theory of 
techniques of the body in his famous short essay “Les Techniques du corps” 
published in 1936, the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss asserted that 
there are traditional effective techniques of the body through which human 
beings learn how to use their bodies. Beginning with a specific description 
of swimming and diving techniques, Mauss comes to the general 
conclusion that there is no such thing as natural behavior. The idea of the 
organs unified into the organism through particular techniques calls to mind 
Gilles Deleueze and Felix Guattari’s essay about “a body without organs,” 
in their book A Thousand Plateaus}5 For them, the organism is one of the 
main obstacles which persons face when trying “to ‘find themselves”’ 
(Deleueze and Guattari: 156).
Let us consider the three great strata concerning us, in other words, the 
ones that most directly bind us: the organism, signifiance, and 
subj edification. The surface of the organism, the angle of signifiance and
15 Gilles Deleueze and Felix Guattari, “November 28, 1947: How Do You Make 
Yourself a Body without Organs?,” in A Thousand Plateaus1149-66.
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interpretation, and the point of subjectification or subjection. You will be 
organized, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body -  
otherwise you’re just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, 
interpreter and interpreted -  otherwise you’re just a deviant. You will be a 
subject, nailed down as one, a subject of the enunciation recoiled into a 
subject of the statement -  otherwise you’re just a tramp, (Deleueze and 
Guattari: 159)
It is obvious that here Deleueze and Guattari have in mind Lacan’s concept 
of the mirror stage in the child’s development, that is, the stage when the 
child acquires the so called schema of her or his unified body. Through 
acquiring this “schema” or “image” the child gets the notion of her or his 
own identity and becomes capable to use the pronoun “I.” The point is that 
this schema or image, as Lacan stresses it, is actually fictive, unreal. 
Moreover, in this way the symbolic order is imposed on the child. And it is 
only through this order that s/he can expresses herself or himself as a 
subject or “L” Forming a body without organs, that is, by disintegrating the 
organism, one is capable of experiencing something real, beyond language 
or symbolic order.
Thus, we can read Albahari’s story as an account of the process of 
one’s deliberate disintegration in order to reach something real. And that is 
exactly the meaning of the koan: the process of breaking free of reason or 
symbolic order and of developing intuition in order to achieve 
enlightenment. We can relate this meaning to the previous one and say that 
“The Koan of the Story” tells us about a possible disintegration of the
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identity of “he” through the disintegration of “his” body as. the only way for 
“him” to step out of the symbolic order and achieve enlightenment.
IV
T h e r e  is o n e  m o r e  m e a n in g  of this story, which is particularly important 
in the context of contemporary Serbian fiction. As I suggested, writing 
about the author of the story, some critics of Serbian literature object that 
postmodernist writers do nothing but experiment with narrative forms, that 
they do not try to say anything relevant about society or life experience. In 
other words, these critics imply that there is no good reason for reading this 
kind of fiction, because the reader cannot find anything that s/he could be 
,interested in. Underneath such objections, there is the tacit accusation that 
postmodernist writers are not engaged in the discussion of social issues, 
namely in criticism of the social system of the former Yugoslavia.
. That this is not true can be shown even on the example of this short 
story. During the 1970s and 1980s a system of “socialist,” or “workers’” 
“self-management” was established in Yugoslavia. Nominally, it put 
workers in a position to make their own decisions about their jobs and the 
factories they worked in. Directors were supposed only to realize their 
decisions. Decisions were made by voting, by raising hands. There were 
many means by which politicians and directors could manipulate workers’ 
votes, particularly because voting was not secret but public. Thus, if we 
understand “raising a hand” as a means of voting in the first part of the 
sentence, and “my hand” as a metonymic replacement of “my vote” in the
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last part, it is obvious that this story alludes to the great possibility of . 
manipulating the workers’ votes. “He” in this case could be a worker who 
considers the reasons for taking part in an obvious fraud.
*  *  *
Is ALL OF THIS too much for such a short story? Probably it is. However, the 
point is that this story does riot constrain the reader’s response by its 
brevity. On the contrary, it is exactly its brevity that causes the reader’s 
impression that something is lacking, which forces her or him to search for 
its. meaning by placing it in different contexts. On the other hand, the 
story’s complexity, the particular tension between the possible meanings of 
the parts of the story taken one by one and as a whole, serves as a firm 
ground for the different contextualizations of “The Koan of the Story.”
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4. T h e  H y st e r ic  v e r s u s  t h e  H e r m e n e u t ic  
C ir c le
As WE COULD SEE in the interlude, an apparently simple question can be 
read as a complete story within a particular context, or, in Fish’s terms, 
within a particular “form of life:” Within the context of theorizing about the 
relationship between the subject’s identity and its body, what at first 
seemed unacceptable as a story, having no beginning, middle or end, turned 
out to be a complete story in the classical terms of Aristotelian poetics. The 
same method of interpretation will be used in the reading of Judita § algo’s 
novel The Road to Birobidzan. However, the interpretative problem that 
this book presents the readers with is of a different kind. Here, we are 
talking about an unfinished novel that ought to be read as complete.
I
ONE OF t h e  m a jo r  h e r m e n e u t ic  r u l e s  foregrounds the relation between 
the text as a whole and its specific parts. This relation allows us to interpret 
the text through a twofold process: we can understand the whole text by 
understanding its parts, and we can understand its parts by understanding 
the whole text. No one of these two complementary readings dominates the 
other, and, in spite of our reading experience, it is taken that they are 
simultaneous. Both readings are necessary for the establishment of a valid
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interpretation. Taking into account this rule, it is easy to claim that we can 
interpret and understand only those texts that are completed. In other words, 
texts that are unfinished prevent an interpreter from closing the hermeneutic 
circle. However, literary history offers a number of examples of unfinished 
works that were and still are the focus of literary criticism, which 
demonstrates that ‘unfinished* does not necessarily have to mean 
‘incomplete*.
In contemporary Serbian fiction Judita Sal go’s novel The Road to 
Birobidlan is particularly interesting in this respect. Judita 5algo died 
before she managed to finish the novel. According to her statements, given 
shortly before she died, she managed to write half of her novel. 
Furthermore, only half of the written manuscript was ready for publishing. 
Judita Salgo published two completed chapters in literary periodicals, and 
two chapters remained finished and unpublished until she died; 
immediately after her death these two chapters were also published. This 
means that only one quarter of the whole novel was ready to be offered to 
the readers. Yet, a careful reader could easily conclude that Judita Salgo left 
her manuscript at a stage when she still thought about several possible 
versions of some apparently completed parts of the novel. In spite of this, I 
am inclined to argue that we can approach Judita Salgo*s The Rdad to 
Birobidzan as a completed work of literature.
To explain my inclination Ï will discuss Salgo*s novel on two levels. 
The first one is the level of the novel’s structure; the second is the thematic 
level. It could easily be argued that The Road to Birobidzan was supposed 
to have an embedded (ring like) narrative structure. The story about the
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Novi Sad family Rot, unfolding in the aftermath of the Second World War : 
encompasses several stories: the story about the poet Nenad Mitrov, the 
story about the American branch of the Rot family tree (both stories begin 
prior to the Second World War, and they end in the narrative time of the 
overarching story), and the most voluminous story, about Bertha 
Pappenheim (one could say, a novel within a novel), which covers a time 
span of four decades -  from the final decade of the 19th century to the 
1930s.
The embedded structure, of the novel is repeated at the level of the 
structure of the individual chapters: the story about Nenad Mitrov 
encompasses the stories about the Russian emigree Maria Alexandrovna 
and the ' Soviet revolutionary Larisa Reisner, and the story aboùt the 
Rosenbergs is inserted into the American Rot family story.
The important characters in the novel, with the exception of Maria 
Alexandrovna, are Jewish.
The central motif in all the parts of thé novel -  with the exception of 
the Bertha Pappenheim story, where the motif of the “women’s continent” 
performs the same function -  is the “Autonomous Jewish Region of 
Birobidzan.” This motif is the knot of all lines of narration and meaning. As 
both sides of the utopian image of the land once promised to the chosen 
people, as a New Jerusalem that the protagonists are obsessively seeking, as 
a refuge for the poor, the disfigured, for those who are scared, marginalized, 
terminally ill -  BirobidZan stands at the beginning, as a distant goal, and at 
the end, as redemption unachieved, of the motivation sequences of the 
novel. Therefore, every attempt at interpretation ought to explain the
- symbolic place of Birobidzan in the semantic structure of the novel. The 
semantically privileged, or, hierarchically superior position of this motif 
(when compared to other elements of the novel), is confirmed by the . 
introductory “Song on BirobidZan," serving as a dramatic prologue which 
introduces the protagonists and suggests the subject of the novel.
The novel is mostly narrated in the third person. We have here an 
omniscient, reliable narrator, who tells the story consistently to the very 
end, using the realist technique most of the time. What is specific to this 
narration, however, is that close to the end of both chapters, as well as to 
the end of the novel itself, the narrative situation changes: the previously 
all-encompassing perspective of the narrator is reduced to the perspectives 
of individual characters, and the realist narrative framework disintegrates 
into a fantastic one.
The chapter on lost tribes ends with the statements by witnesses 
which were, the narrator tells us, “to a certain extent mutually exclusive and 
did not contribute to a solution of the case” (Salgo 1997: 60). The narrator 
herself/himself does not intervene in this instance, although the privileged 
position of the all-knowing one should certainly have offered her/him the 
possibility to tell us what had actually happened. Thus the case of the 
disappearance of Dora Levin, the primary protagonist in the story about the 
unsolved mystery of “lost” tribes, remains unexplained.
Another important characteristic of Judita § algo’s narration is the 
technique of giving. individual, temporally and spatially circumscribed 
events general meaning which is in contrast with the above-mentioned 
device of shifting the narrative perspective from the omniscient to the
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limited one belonging to an individual character. Therefore, it is possible to 
say that the end of every narrative unit is characterized by this shift in 
narration, from omniscient to a limited perspective, and the disintegration 
of the realist narrative framework into a fantastic one, but also by the 
technique of giving universal meaning to temporally and spatially defined 
events. This technique is similar to the technique used in filmmaking, when 
a close-up is followed by a panoramic shot without a cut in the scene. This 
narrative device, however, does not have to be presented only on the level 
of visual linages : at the end of the story about lost tribes, the disappearance 
of Dina Levin is reason enough for one of the protagonists to conclude that, 
the whole world is lost.
Finally, one could say that there is reason enough to speak about the 
formal and thematic wholeness of the novel. On the one hand, the repetition 
of the ring-like pattern and the shift in the narrative situation at the end of 
every narrative unit allows us to establish the narrative pattern of Judita 
§ algo’s novel. On the other hand, it is not. likely that any significant 
thematic divergences might occur. For example, according to § algo’s notes, 
the protagonists of one of the unwritten chapters should have been the 
Rosenbergs. From a parenthetical remark we learn that the “secret plan to 
send, the Rosenbergs to Birobidzan” (Salgo 1997: 64) was supposed to 
function as an element of the plot, which is logical, since: “All roads to 
Birobidzan lead through prisons, police quarters etc.” (Salgo 1997: 64). 
Thus, we can claim thematic wholeness for the novel with some certainty.
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A t  t h e  f ir s t  g l a n c e , perhaps because of the numerous comments, most of 
which would probably not be included in the final version of the novel, it 
seems that The Road to Birobidzan opens up to interpretation and 
understanding with no difficulty. For example, it is easy to associate the 
embedded ring-like structure with the explanation of the initial O. from 
Bertha Pappenheim’s pseudonym:
The name Anna O. is a synonym for a large, cosmic hysteric circle (from 
which there is no exit), hysteric whirlpool, that draws and sucks in the 
. world. (Salgo 1997: 103)
What the narrative ring of the novel has “sucked in,” are the rings from the 
novel’s embedded structure, the rings that in turn “suck in” other rings, and 
in each ring, as in a whirlpool, a world is disappeared, a world in which the 
destitute, the disfigured, the disenfranchised and the sick are trying in vain 
to leave the circle from which there is no exit. But, even if there was a way 
out of it, if, through some miracle, a way out would be shown to them, a 
way out of their own story, their own ring, they Would only find themselves 
trapped in another ring. Or, in the words of Sara Alkalaj :
At these fatal points, it. will turn out, whichever bend may already have 
been overtaken, whichever rock already climbed, one will come to see the 
same scenery, the same terrain that he had just passed through. No matter 
how far one goes, the same vista will open up before one’s eyes. So he
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keeps climbing the same rock he had already climbed, and after every 
bend he keeps coming down to the same gorge he had just come out of. 
(Salgo 1997: 173-4)
But, is that everything? Does Judita Salgo talk only of cripples and the 
terminally ill. who wandér from place to place in search of a refuge? If the 
stories about Nenad Mitrov and prostitutes with syphilis fit into this model, 
the story of the American branch of the Rot family tree definitely does not. 
Bertha Pappenheim also manages to escape these prescriptions, and so do 
Larisa Reisner, Flora Gutman and Haim Azriel. What forces these 
characters to keep looking for Birobidzan? Is BirobidZan simply a promised 
land where a great Healing would take place? Here is a list of possible 
meanings of BirobidZan:
A women’s continent or an island?
BirobidZan is an unknown, repressed core of the human self (the 
subconscious?)... The embodiment, the earthly recreation, the core of 
neurosis.
BirobidZan is a cduntiy where there is no murder. This is a dream 
of a man (woman) who killed an old Arab in fear, without a reason.
BirobidZan is a madhouse.
, BirobidZan is the FINAL SOLUTION (Hitler’s secret plan in the 
attack on USSR).
BirobidZan as an ideal city (utopia).
BirobidZan as a homeland one keeps “just in case.”
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BirobidZan as a swampland, breeding ground for Jewish semen 
(A New Zion?).
BirobidZan -  the last refuge (on Earth) of active magical thinking 
and living. (Salgo 1997: 63)
It is obvious that all the meanings listed cannot be subsumed under one, 
comprehensive meaning. Even if they are not mutually exclusive, they do 
not converge. But, since each and every one of them becomes functional in 
one part of the novel, none should be neglected. So, instead of reinforcing 
the interpretation that seemed graspable for a moment, the series of. 
explanations of what BirobidZan is does exactly the opposite: it makes the 
text impenetrable with its polisemy. However, maybe it is exactly this 
polysemy that makes it possible for us to make some advances in the 
understanding of The Road to Birobidzan, rather than putting an end to all 
interpretation.
What kind of a polysemy are we dealing with? If this was just an 
arbitrary attribution of meanings, the impression of the completeness of the 
novel would not be possible. Had that been the case, the novel would break 
down into separate stories, and there would be .as many stories as there are 
different, independent meanings arbitrarily assigned to the same sign- 
symbol. But, since that is not the case, the novel, although unfinished, 
leaves the impression of a complete whole, and we have to come to a 
conclusion that there is something more to it than some arbitrary, 
unmotivated polysemy.
. Therefore, the next question ought to be: is there after all à meaning 
that could encompass all other different meanings of BirobidZan? And, 
consequently, on which level can BirobidZan and the “women’s continent” 
be synonyms, meaning the same thing, performing the same function? 
BirobidZan is, in the narrative world o f Judita Salgo, “an unknown, 
repressed core of the human self,” and a “women’s continent” has:
[...] come out from Bertha’s excited brain as a warning or a prophecy 
before embarking on a dangerous journey, as a code/signifier of a long- 
forgotten starting point or an unclear, barely discernible goal... (Salgo 
1997:74)
So, on the level of the unconscious as well as the subconscious, all other 
meanings of BirobidZan and women’s continent can finally converge, be 
unified -  and it is hysteria that calls them into conscience and makes them 
real. Similar to the claim of the author of Interpretation o f Dreams that the 
whole diversity of the problem of conscience can be made visible only in 
the analysis of the process of thinking in hysteria, one could say that it is 
possible to understand the “whole diversity” of the phenomenon of 
BirobidZan in Judita Êalgo’s novel only after we have analyzed the 
“hysteric mechanism” and the way it operates.
In some of its characteristics, the space in The Road to Birobidzan is 
significantly different from real space. “The travellers" to BirobidZan move 
in a space that has some qualities of the human psyche. Just like the psyche 
is split into the conscious and the unconscious, this space, we could say, is
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divided into areas of the real and the imaginary. We should, however, keep 
in mind that the area of the “imaginary” is no less real in the world of the 
novel than the area of “real” itself. This division into the “real,” geographic 
space, and the “imaginary” space of BirobidZan or the women’s continent 
corresponds in all aspects to the division of the psyche into the areas of the 
conscious and the unconscious. All other spatial relations in the novel are 
subordinated to this division. That is why, in the world of the novel, 
sentences like
Women’s continent is “there” where Mrs. Frank is going, and where 
women are sailing to, and “here.” To be here and there at the same time. 
That is the secret of women’s illness. And of the Women’s continent. 
(Salgo 1997: 156) '
make sense, while, in the world outside the novel, they would be absurd.
The coordinates of the real and the imaginary space cannot be 
determined within the world of the novel, as if it were something that is 
“here” or “there,” or “up” or “down.” Just as Freud claimed that it is 
erroneous to speak about the conscious and the unconscious as if they were 
two separate and defined locations within the psyche, the idea of the real 
and the imaginary as two separate locations within the fictional world of 
The Road to Birobidzan is also erroneous. Much more appropriate than the 
spatial, i.e. the static mode of representing this fictional world, is the 
dynamic, expressed in the syntagm “moving, wandering (exodus) while 
remaining in one place” (Salgo 1997: 63). The word “moving” is also used
only conditionally here. The characters of Judita Salgo’s novel can travel in 
two significantly different ways. One corresponds to the standard meaning 
of the. word “travel.” The other way to move, travel, or to go on a journey is 
-  hysteria. The journey of Bertha Pappenheim across the Balkans to 
Alexandria, the narrator tells us
[„.] occurs on two levels: the first is utilitarian, pragmatic -  it leaves a 
trace, it can be read in her letters collected and published by Sisyphus 
Arbeit in Leipzig in 1924; and the other is hysteric, it is, we could say, the 
journey of Bertha’s womb, the last journey, on which that womb is 
questioning itself, summarizing the decades of its travels... (§algo 1997: 
149)
In the hierarchy of values of the fictional world of The Road to Birobidzan, 
travelling that occurs on the first level is significantly ‘below’ the travelling 
that occurs on the second level, meaning -  hysteria. Only hysteria offers the 
most significant knowledge, discoveries, emotions; only a hysteric journey 
makes possible an understanding of the world and of the self (Salgo 1997: 
107). Travelling oh the first level is always a one-way process, the traveller 
and the world remain unaffected by each other, unchanged, as if they had 
never met. On the other hand, travelling on the second, other level is a two- 
way process. It can also be represented as Bertha’s abandoning or breaking 
of the “customary idea of the world,” and as a “hysteric incursion of the 
world into her” (Salgo 1997: 107). Hysteria is fraught with, ambiguity: 
strongly tied to two different worlds, it connects them, yet at the same time,
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it does not belong to either of them. Hysteria is the quivering of the porous 
membrane of the subconscious, which separates, yet at the same time also 
allows two different worlds to permeate each other. “The hysteric 
incursion” is the penetration of Birobidzan into the “real” world, but also 
the removal of the protagonists from the real world into the “imaginary” 
world.
However, the analogy between Freud’s idea of the conscious and the 
unconscious on the one hand, and the “real” and the “imaginary” space in 
the fictional world of The Road to Birobidzan, on the other, is only partially 
valid. Quite on the contrary, although there is no doubt that Freud’s 
division of the psyche into the areas of the conscious and the unconscious 
did serve as an organizing principle in the construction of the fictional 
world of The Road to Birobidzan, in some important instances arid points in 
the story, Judita Salgo disregards or even distorts some of Freud’s most 
significant conclusions, just like she changes the facts of Bertha 
Pappenheim’s biography.
“Why did Anna O. appear thirty years ago? What did that part of her 
personality want to achieve with that appearance? What was the message of 
its hysteria?” wonders the narrator in a chapter titled “The Secret Life of 
Bertha Pappenheim,” and continues:
Breuer and Freud did not dwell on this. They accepted the message of 
therapy that Bertha Pappenheim left on their hands. Anna O. certainly had 
her task, mission even, otherwise she would never let out a word, she 
wouldn’t have manifested herself. What did she want to tell the world?
What to create or destroy? To call the scientific world’s, and the wider 
public’s attention to or away from something? Breuer and Freud obscured 
things, they led things to their advantage and Anna followed them -  it 
. seemed to her she did this for her own good -  but she forgot her message, 
the message of her illness. (Salgo 1997: 103)
The main narrative elements in this excerpt are grouped around the 
character of Bertha Pappenheim: she is the person who has a mission, who 
carries a message, and who, finally, becomes prevented from the fulfillment 
of that task. One could also say that Breuer and Freud are nothing but 
peripheral characters whose characterization is reduced to a .few strokes: 
they do not dwell on details in their work, they come to important 
conclusions by pure chance, but even on those occasions they miss the most 
important things, therefore they try to obscure things, having solely their 
own interests in mind. To continue along these lines, we could conclude 
that their only function is to prevent Bertha Pappenheim from delivering 
her message to the world, and once they have done that, there is no more 
reason for them to . appear . in the novel again.16 Finally, their
16 In the novel, Freud appears again as a character whose action, to some extent, 
influences the course o f  narrated events. On this occasion, M artha Freud is 
attributed with telling her friend Bertha Pappenheim that her husband writes to 
her about not exactly yearning to come home, which he calls his beloved 
prison. She compared him to Antaeus, who loses his strength when he is close 
to his home, and acquires it as soon as he is away from it. But in spite of this, 
she says, he always comes back. Then comes the sentence: “Unlike Freud, 
Bertha herself HAD NO STRENGTH to leave her hometown of Vienna 
forever, and Freud was indirectly responsible for this” (Salgo 1997: 72; capitals 
mine).
HAD NO STRENGTH in the quoted sentence, I strongly believe, 
should be HAD STRENGTH, and I believe this is either a typing mistake made 
in the retyping of the text, or perhaps even an omission on the part of the author 
herself. Only in this case the beginning of the sentence (“Unlike Freud. ..”)
characterization seems to be reflective of what they are supposed to be 
doing: they are superficial, possess average intellectual abilities and they 
are occupied with themselves mostly, so it is only logical that they “obscure 
things,” that, they lead things to their advantage, and thereby force Anna 0. 
to forget her message. Still, this is too simplified to be correct.
I would say that this is one of the key parts of the novel -  the only 
point at which both Breuer and Freud appear as active characters in the 
novel.17 Having in mind that the main protagonist of the largest part of the
makes sense. Especially since the historical Bertha Pappenheim did leave 
Vienna in 1888, and moved to Frankfurt.. Judita Salgo mostly did not change 
similar biographical facts in the novel, and this is why she, on one occasion, 
speaks about the “self-sacrificing, rational lady from Frankfurt” (Salgo 1997:
66).
By the way, we cannot determine what Freud’s “responsibility” means here . 
from what is narrated in the novel. It is possible, however, if this was really 
about leaving, and not remaining in Vienna, that the narrator is thinking about 
Freud’s version of the end of the curing process of Anna O., which is 
significantly different from what Breuer wrote in his Studies on Hysteria.
Freud, unlike Breuer, thought that hysteria could hardly be considered apart 
and separately from sexual neuroses (Freud, Sigmund and Josef Breuer Studies 
on Hysteria, trans. James and Alix Strachey, Penguin Books /1974/, page 342). 
Since he did not have this in mind while trying to cure Anna O., Breuer was not 
able to successfully bring her cure to an end. Furthermore, this omission put 
Breuer in a situation where he was not able to control the relationship that 
developed between him and his patient. Freud later said that Breuer decided to 
stop the curing process when he started “feeling guilty” because of his wife. 
Breuer, however, in his report on the case of Anna O. writes that he 
successfully completed the curing process, and that the girl had fully recovered 
her health. In this report there is also no mention of the imaginary pregnancy of . 
Anna O., which was key m Freud's version of the whole case. With the ironic 
remark -  “indirectly responsible,” the narrator adds another negative quality to 
Freud’s character in the novel: inclination to spread gossip.
17 Of course, having in mind that this is an unfinished work, we should take the 
statement that certain characters appear only once in the novel with some 
reserve. What I mean to say is that we cannot know whether the finished 
manuscript would change something in this respect, that is, whether there 
would be other occasions of Freud and Breuer appearing in the text. Still, I 
believe that even in such a case, there would be no significant changes, 
compared to the original text — the text we have. I already said that based on 
what is accessible to us, we can speak with certainty about a formal and 
semantic completeness of The Road to Birobidzan, and then also about the
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novel is Bertha Pappenheim, Brener’s patient who opened the way for 
psychoanalysis, it is somewhat strange that Breuer and Freud are not more 
represented within the novel. Their being left out is also surprising if we 
have in mind the fictional potential of the biographical material on the 
mutual relationships of these three people. By itself, this fact allows for 
certain conclusions. One of them would be: the story about the founders of 
psychoanalysis is a narrative stream that is deliberately held back, but 
whosë traces the reader can still follow.
Based on numerous details that point to this, it is clear that Judita 
Salgo was well read in psychoanalytic literature. This is why we cannot 
read the sentence in which the narrator is informing us that Breuer and 
Freud did not dwell much on Anna O.’s case as a simple accommodation of 
factual material to the structural needs of narration. If someone who is well 
informed about the emergence and the development of psychoanalysis, 
writes that Freud did not dwell on the case and that he was only interested 
in the therapy-aspect of the case, in spite of many of Freud’s statements that 
mention the crucial importance of Anna O. for further conclusions about 
the functioning of the human psyche, then the conclusions must necessarily 
allow for something more serious than a simple accommodation of facts to 
the needs of the story. Because, if w e. suppose that the point was the 
prevention of Anna O. from. completing her mission, the sequence in 
question could have been solved differently. However, something else is at 
stake here. What we have is a very clear value judgment. The narrator, in
relatively stable place of Breuer and Freud in the semantic structure of the
novel.
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these few sentences, simply rejects psychoanalytic theory as that which 
“obscures things.”
Another clue that points to this is the fact that there is no reason 
whatsoever to mention Breuer and Freud at this point in the novel. Anna O. 
was Breuer* s patient. Freud learned of the case in its entirety only after the 
curing process was completed. Freud himself reproached Breuer for 
missing the opportunity to reach very important conclusions, out of respect 
for conventions. The claim that Bertha Pappenheim discovered how to 
eliminate the symptoms of hysteria herself is also not to be contested; 
Breuer could not do much but support her in those attempts. So, had the 
narrator mentioned only Breuer, and not both doctors, this would have been 
a simple adoption of material, without significant interventions. In other 
words, the only intervention the author made, when compared to the 
original material, concerns Freud -  he is constructed to play a role that 
Breuer alone played in the real world. ,
Now we might answer the question: why is the theory that promotes 
the very principles that the fictional world of the novel rests upon, why is 
that theory presented as that which “obscures things”? Put more mildly, this 
question might become: what are the aspects of Freud’s work that the 
author has accepted, and which of them did she, based on her own beliefs, 
want to reject? There is no doubt that the division between the conscious 
and the unconscious is never questioned; had this happened, the structure of 
the whole novel would have been disrupted, and the central motifs of
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Birobidzan, the women’s continent and hysteria would have been deprived 
of meaning..
The answer might be found in a careful reading of the excerpt about 
Bertha Pappenheim’s curing treatment:
That cure (or “cure”) from hysteria,. actually put an end to her life. 
Everything stopped then. Oh. that perverse Greek, who understood, that 
hysteria is actually the womb’s wandering through a woman’s body! Her 
. womb, Bertha’s womb, had just matured and embarked on a journey, 
went off wandering with curiosity, convulsive and insolent, self-sufficient 
and rebellious -  and without a goal! hysterically! -  when she was 
suddenly and shrewdly stopped on the brink of her great adventure, her 
great life journey. So abandoned she stood, forgotten, restrained, 
confused and obstructed by illusory health for whole three decades. 
(Salgo 1997: 93-4)
Although in his report Breuer wrote that Anna O. was cured, her illness 
kept returning to her, in a very serious form at that. This is why the narrator 
calls it the “cure” and also stresses Bertha Pappenheim’s “illusory health.” 
In this respect the facts of the fictional and of the real, historical world, 
coincide. However, at another point in the novel, Bertha’s illness is 
described as “incurable, unknowable” (Salgo 1997: 84). This is a serious 
departure from the historical material. Freud later analyzed the case of 
Anna O. to the smallest detail, offering among other things the reasons why 
Breuer could not cure his patient. Furthermore, Freud also strongly believed
that psychoneuroses were curable. Judita Salgo knew this well. And still, 
the narrator stresses that this is an “incurable, unknowable hysteria.” 
. Naturally, what is at stake here is not the scientific validity of Freud’s 
conclusions and explanations, so it would not make much sense to claim 
that Judita Salgo rejected Freud’s postulations after carefully examining 
and studying the scientific subject herself. Had it been so, there would have 
been a trace of it in the text. On the contrary, the narrator insists. bn 
“incurability and unknowability” in general. And precisely this is the reason 
behind the rejection of Freud’s conclusions. What is at stake here is not 
their (in)correctness, but the very intention of the Viennese doctor to cure 
the “incurable,” to know the “unknowable.” In other words, what the 
narrator explicitly contests here is Freud’s determinism concerning the 
matters of psychic life. Because events want to “betray, deceive the record,” 
explains the narrator,
[...] events seek to not be written down, to be free, to float freely, wander 
through time and space, so that they can be attributed to one and the 
other, to here and there, to yesterday and tomorrow. (Salgo 1997: 69)
The spaces of freedom in the novel are the “women’s continent,” the 
imaginary BirobidZan, and following the analogy, the area of the 
unconscious. Those are the locations of indeterminacy, and every attempt to 
introduce order into them is actually an act of violence, inhibition, betrayal. 
Only from this viewpoint can we understand why the cure of hysteria is at 
the same time an act of vacating, impoverishment, followed by the feeling
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of defeat, of having been deceived, and used (Salgo 1997: 109). Therefore 
“life without hysteria” is a “life without qualities,” “common life,” which 
excludes the real content of Bertha’s life and personality (Salgo 1997: 109). 
By discovering a “location” of freedom, indeterminacy, or unlimited 
polisemy, Freud tried to introduce order into it, to set the rules, to limit the 
multiplicity of meanings, and that, from the viewpoint of the narrator of 
The .Road to Birobizan, obscures the “most authentic knowledge of the 
world and of the self,” accessible only through a fit of hysteria (Salgo 1997: 
107)i Because:
Dream and consciousness, birth and death, sexual intercourse and dying, 
all are just forms of a hysteric fit. The universe is hysterically bent, 
stooping. (Salgo 1997: 107)
Thus it turns out that the “most authentic knowledge” is the awareness of 
the boundary between the speakable and the imaginable, on the one hand, 
and the unspeakable and the unimaginable on the other, -  hysteria itself. 
Nothing can be said about the women’s continent, or about the imaginary 
Birobidzan, dr for that matter about the unconscious, and thus nothing 
specific should be said about them; one can only speak about the 
experience of the boundary, and an awareness of it represents authentic 
knowledge. This is why Birobidzan can carry a variety of different 
meanings, and at the same time, no meaning in particular. That is why on 
the level of the novel that concerns the social activity of Bertha 
Pappenheim, that is, the messianic or utopian aspect of her public work, the .
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following sentence sounds like a final conclusion: “Now I know freedom is 
about self-denial, withdrawal, now I realize, the only utopia worth 
struggling for, worth living, is the utopia of total isolation, of the 
renunciation of positive utopia” (Salgo 1997: 154).18
The death of Nenad Mitrov, the disappearance of Dina Levin, the 
fleeing forest, all of these events are supposed to remain unexplained, these: . 
are the border cases, a hysteric permeation of worlds, and that is why the 
realistic narrative framework has retreated before the fantastic one. These 
are the events that, also, want to “deceive the record,” that want to remain 
“free, to float freely, wander through time and space,” that seek to be 
“attributed to one and the other, to here and there, to yesterday and 
tomorrow,” and on the narrative level this is suggested by a generalization 
of the narrative perspective.
BirobidZan is not a truth that can be repeated in the same form, and 
that is why it cannot be a subject of common knowledge. To cut across the 
space that is BirobidZan in order to establish an order of limited meanings, 
just like Freud’s explanation of the unconscious, is necessarily followed by 
an exclusion, omission, censorship of authentic qualities, of the “real 
content of life and personality.” This is only one step away from a view of 
language understood in Saussurian terms as the clandestine system of 
expressive signs, which builds its units by constituting itself between two 
amorphous masses.
18 The ironic comment about the social involvement of Bertha Pappenheim can be 
recognized in the name of the publisher — Sisyphus Arbeit — that published her 
letters from the journey “across the Balkans to Alexandria,” the journey that 
“yielded no results” and that “will have no effect” (Salgo 1997: 66).
HI
W r it in g  a b o u t  t h e  c a s e  of Anna O. in her essay “Hysteria, 
Psychoanalysis, and Feminism,” Dianne Hunter stresses -  likewise the 
narrator of Salgo’s novel -  that Dr. Breuer “never fully recognized the 
meaning of his encounter with Pappenheim.” This statement could be 
understood in two ways. First, it seems that it is possible to say that Hunter 
merely repeats Freud’s comment on the case of Anna O.: namely, Freud 
objected that in trying to cure Anna O. Breuer failed to recognize the 
phenomenon of transference that could have led him to the core of the new 
psychiatric method named psychoanalysis. Hunter writes:
When Freud began to uncover the role of transference love in hypnosis 
and psychoanalysis, and to stress the importance of the sexuality in 
neuroses, Breuer dissociated himself from his controversial colleague. 
Although Pappenheim had led the way to the unconscious through her 
invention of the “talking cure” and her dramatization of transference love 
in the doctor-patient relation, Breuer resisted the implications of their 
encounter. (Hunter 1997: 262)
However, this way of reading Hunter’s claim could be seen as a kind of 
overreading or misinterpretation. Namely, Hunter specifies that both “Freud 
and Breuer offer an inadequate explanation for Pappenheim’s linguistic 
symptom.” It thus turns out -  according to Hunter, as well as according to 
the narrator of the novel -  that not only did Breuer never fully recognize the
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meaning of his encounter with Pappenheim, but that both of them, Breuer 
and Freud, did not manage to provide a valid explanation for Pappenheim’s 
linguistic symptom.
From this second possible reading of her claim one can infer that 
Hunter presupposes that the valid explanation of the linguistic symptom.is 
more important than the recognition of transference: otherwise there would 
have been no reason to claim that both Breuer and Freud failed to provide 
the valid explanation of the case of Anna O. Now it is possible to ask, why 
is the linguistic symptom so important? And how is it related to the case of 
Anna O.’s hysteria?
Writing about “the blind spot of an old dream of symmetry,” in her 
book Speculum o f the Other Woman, Luce Irigaray defines hysteria as 
follows: “Hysteria is all she has.left” (Irigaray 1985: 71). This is just one of 
a number of ironic comments and conclusions that Irigaray deduces -  
seemingly by the way -  from her examination of Freud’s writings about 
women. Irigaray’s conclusion is preceded by an analysis of the woman’s 
position within the framework of language. She claims that woman is
subject to the norms of a signifying economy, she is an outsider, and
.
therefore she cannot coin her own signifiera. “She borrows signifiera,” 
Irigaray explains, “but cannot make her mark, or re-mark upon them” 
(Irigaray 1985: 71). This keeps her, Irigaray concludes, “deficient, empty, 
lacking, in a way that could be labelled ‘psychotic’: a latent but not actual 
psychosis, for want of a practical signifying system” (Irigaray 1985: 71). 
There is no way, according to Irigaray, in Which woman can express her 
instincts. Her instincts are “in abeyance, in limbo, in vacuo”.(Irigaray 1985:
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71). Woman thus can choose either to censor her instincts completely, or to 
treat them as -  convert them into -  hysteria (Irigaray 1985: 72). Here 
Irigaray relies implicitly on Lacan’s writings, as well as on Kristeva’s. By 
“language” she obviously assumes the Lacanian symbolic order, or the 
“law.” As far as “her instincts” are concerned, it is possible to relate, them 
to Kristeva’s concept of chora. Since the symbolic order, or language, is by 
definition phallocentric, if woman wants to be accepted and recognized as a 
subject within the established linguistic system, she ought to submit herself 
to this order, which means that she has to censor her indeterminacy and 
undecidability, that are in Kristeva’s terms inherent to the state of chora, or 
to treat them as, or convert them into, hysteria. In this way hysteria becomes 
a means through which the woman can express herself by avoiding or 
undermining language or the symbolic order.
Dianne Hunter analyzes the case of Anna O. within the same 
Lacanian and Kristevian frameworks. She emphasizes that “linguistically 
constituted subjectivity (T  versus ‘you,’ ‘he’ versus ‘she,’ and syntactical 
relations) is superimposed upon our rhythmical, corporeal rapport with the 
mother” (Hunter 1997: 265), and then continues,
Prior to our accession to the grammatical order of language, we exist in a 
dyadic, semiotic world of pure sound and . body rhythms, oceanically at 
one with our nurturer. [...] Our sense of ourselves as separate beings, as 
“subjects,” is bound up with our entry into the order of language in which 
speech becomes a substitute for bodily connection. The world we as
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children enter is. always, already . constituted, and governed by the 
language. (Hunter 1997: 265)
Within such a theoretical framework, Hunter is able to establish the 
following interpretation of Bertha Pappenheim’s hysteria:
A child reared in a family such as Bertha Pappenheim’s makes her 
transition to speech as part of a process according to which she recognizes 
the father’s privileged relation to the mother. In the order of language, .“I” 
and “you” conceptualize and mark separate persons, as “she” and “he,” 
“mother” and “father,” differentiate genders and roles. (Hunter 1997: 
265)
“In this light,” Hunter concludes, “Bertha Pappenheim’s linguistic discord 
and conversion symptoms, her use of gibberish and gestures as means of 
expression, can be seen as a regression from the cultural order represented 
by her father as an orthodox patriarch” (Hunter 1997: 266). However, it is 
not quite clear why Hunter uses the term “regression” in the previous claim. 
It is possible to say that Bertha Pappenheim, for example, avoids, or 
undermines, or subverts the existing “law” in order to express herself 
independently of the patterns that are imposed on her through the process of 
acquisition of language. Namely, it is hot clear how the replacement of the 
mother tongue by the foreign languages in the case of Anna 0. can be seen 
as a regression. Yet, it is possible to understand Hunter’s term if one relates 
it to Kristeva’s concept of cAom. .
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According to Kristeva, chora is the prelinguistic stage in the 
development of a child, which precedes the mirror phase and the Oedipal 
phase. It is possible to describe chora as the chaotic state of shifting, 
undecidable impressions. There are no stable meanings and identities in 
chora. To establish stable meanings and identities it is necessary to split the 
chaotic continuum of chora into a sequence of definite parts. This splitting 
is done by language, or the symbolic order that is imposed on a continuum 
of shifting impressions. According to this, Hunter’s term “regression” 
denotes a temporal backward movement to the stage of chora, that is, to the 
state of undecidable meanings and unstable identities. Such a movement 
can be seen as a subversive act that undermines the “law.” Therefore it 
should be strictly controlled and constrained.
Writing about the “stories of the insane,” Roy Porter claims that 
“the history of madness is the history of power” (Porter 1988: 39). 
Although it is rather dim, Porter’s claim could be understood in the 
following way: since madness is something that stands out of, or on the 
very border of the symbolic order or the “law” and thus demonstrates the 
limits of the order that manifests itself as eternal and universal, madness 
becomes a matter of a continuous effort of defining and determining the 
boundaries. For example, if we define hysteria within the existing order, it 
loses its capability of being subversive and becomes an element of the 
already established system. And that is exactly what Freud tried to do, or at 
least he did within the imaginary world of § algo’s novel.
It seems that it is now possible to construe, the full meaning of the 
quoted passage on Breuer and Freud. While it is easy to explain the explicit
accusation as far as Breuer is concerned, things are much more complicated 
in the case of Freud. However, one explanation seems plausible. In the 
fictional world of The Road to Birobidzan Freud represents -  in fact, 
protects -  the symbolic order. He blurs the message of Anna O. by 
introducing the concept of transference, translating thus the particular 
language of Bertha Pappenheim into the existing phallogocentric language 
of the established “law.” Bertha Pappenheim’s “hysteric” language enabled 
her to express her shifting impressions by undermining the stable meanings 
and identities of her “mother tongue.” Probably this was her message, and 
her mission -  that it is possible to subvert the “law.” However, the “law” 
responded through Dr. Breuer and Dr. Freud by claiming Anna O. as 
insane. This may also explain Dr. Breuer’s astonishing fabrication of the 
successful treatment of Bertha Pappenheim. One just has to ask, whose 
health Dr. Breuer was concerned about: was he speaking about the recovery 
of Bertha Pappenheim or about the recovery of the “law” itself?
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*  *  *
A l t h o u g h  in  §  a l g o ’s  n o v e l  Freud and Breuer were explicitly accused of 
preventing Anna O. from delivering her message, and although they were 
ultimately presented as the defenders of the “law,” at one moment the 
narrator claims that Anna O.’s mission was doomed to failure. How are we 
to understand this claim? Is it in contradiction to the accusations against 
Breuer and Freud? If it is true that Anna O.’s mission was doomed to 
failure, then the role Breuer and Freud have in the novel is not essential £md 
it is rather insignificant: she would have fàiled regardless of who was 
curing her and how.
Within the theoretical framework that I chose as a ground for the 
interpretation of The Road to Birobidzan, the meanings of the two 
apparently opposite statements do not necessarily have to be in 
contradiction. It is possible to say that Anna O.’s resistance was of a kind 
that allowed Breuer and Freud to obscure her message and preclude her 
from fulfilling her mission. To put it precisely: her resistance was placed in 
the space of the imaginary and therefore predetermined to be unsuccessful. 
A hysteric resistance is a kind of resistance within the psyche that is not 
directed towards the external world. In terms of Salgo’s Bertha 
Pappenheim, it is “withdrawal,” “the utopia of total isolation.” In Butler’s 
terms, psychic resistance is “located in a domain that is virtually powerless 
to alter the law that it opposes.” For this resistance it is necessary that the 
“law” precedes it in its symbolic form, which means that in a specific way
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it strengthen the ’’law.” Eventually, these are the reasons why psychic 
resistance is “doomed to perpetual defeat.”
Anna O.’s rebellion is a kind of rebellion of Kristeva’s. 
revolutionary subjects. A revolutionary subject opposes the world of 
univocal and discrete meanings by producing a language of multiple sounds 
and meanings. That is the way in which The Road to Birobidzan, by using 
particular narrative devices, affirms two amorphous masses between which 
a clandestine system of expressive sighs builds its units and constitutes 
itself. Nevertheless, although this multiplicity of sounds and meanings -  the 
affirmation of “two amorphous masses” -  thwarts the “law” in its effects, it 
is inevitably subordinated to the “law.” As Judith Butler puts it: if the 
multiplicity of shifting impressions “promotes the possibility of the 
subversion, displacement, or disruption of the paternal law, what meanings 
can those terms have if the Symbolic always reasserts its hegemony” 
(Butler 1990: 80), as a clandestine system of expressive signs, which builds 
its units by constituting itself between two amorphous masses'!
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6. Forming the Identity of I-narrator 
in Samuel Beckett’s “The UnnamAble”
If  "HE" FROM t h e  SHORT k o a n  of the story by Albahari is only able to 
question his identity through questioning the ability to control his limbs, 
and if Anna 0. tried and eventually failed to acquire her new identity, then 
Beckett’s unnamable narrator succeeds in establishing himself as a subject 
different from those subjects hitherto produced by the “law.” If this is the 
correct interpretation of Beckett’s novel, then it turns out that The 
Unnamable can be read within the genre of the novel of formation. Read in 
à number of various contexts, Beckett’s novel often proved to be nearly 
unapproachable. However; read in the context of discussions about body 
and identity, The Unnamable opens itself for more traditional readings.
I
W r it in g  a b o u t  t h e  m e a n s  that an author can use “to impose his fictional 
w o rld  upon  the read er”  in  h is  The Rhetoric o f  Fiction, W ayne B oo th  
particularly pays attention to Laurence Sterne’s novel Tristram Shandy. 
Arguing against some critics’ objections that. Sterne’s novel, being a 
fragmented, incomplete, temporally disordered, discontinuous sequence of 
narrative units, lacks unity and wholeness, Booth states that the carefully 
designed “voice,” or thé character, of the narrator of Sterne’s novel
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provides the firm ground for the integrity of Tristram Shandy's fictional 
world. Nowadays, some forty years after the publication of Booth’s The 
Rhetoric o f Fiction, it is a common place to say that the characteristics of 
the narrator determine the nature of the narration and the narrative world. 
However, the poetics of contemporary narrative fiction in many ways 
challenge this common notion. A number of narrative strategies deployed 
by contemporary writers are direct consequences of the questioning of the 
narrator’s dominant position within the narrative world. Yet, it seems that 
the analytic tools provided by contemporary narratology are not sufficient 
to describe and explain these strategies. One could say that in a certain way 
it is impossible to comprehend contemporary fiction in terms of 
contemporary narratology developed through interpretations of. the 
nineteenth-century realist and the early twentieth-century modernist fiction. 
To demonstrate this it would be enough to look over the particular 
terminology meant to describe the narrators’ place within the fictional 
worlds. Terms like “point of view,” “perspective,” “angle of vision,” and 
“localization” not only have a “purely visual sense” and “optical 
photographie connotations” (Rimmon-Kenan 1988: 71), but also imply that 
there is a certain, determinable subject enabled by narrative means to 
perceive, that there is something that can be perceived, and that there is 
someone capable of verbalizing what is perceived, and, finally, that what is 
perceived can be verbalized. Hence, a kind of mimetic view of literature 
can be revealed underneath these terms, although one of the dominant 
features of contemporary fiction is an explicit undermining and playing 
with the concept of mimesis and all its implications.
Even some of the critics who are very well aware of differences 
between contemporary fiction and previous ones -  realistic and modernist 
fiction -  fail to be consistent in their descriptions. In Postmodernist Fiction, 
Brian McHale distinguishes between modernist and postmodernist fiction 
by formulating two general theses. The dominant of modernist fiction, he 
states, “is epistemological” (McHale 1987: 9), while “the dominant of 
postmodernist fiction is ontological” (McHale 1987:10). He claims that 
modernist fiction deals with questions such as those posed by Dick Higgins: 
“H o w  can  I in te rp re t  this w o rld  o f  w h ich  I am  a  p a rt?  A n d  w hat am  I in  i t? ” 
Then he continues by adding other “typical modernist questions,” such as: 
“What is there to be known?; Who knows it?; How do they know it, and 
with what degree of certainty?; How is knowledge transmitted from one 
knower to another, and with what degree of reliability?; How does the 
object of knowledge change as it passes from knower to knower?; What are 
the limits of the knowable?” (McHale 1987: 9). On the other hand
[...] postmodernist fiction deploys strategies which engage and 
foreground questions like the ones Dick Higgins calls “post-cognitive”: 
“Which world is this? What is to be done in it? Which of my selves is to 
do it?” Other typical postmodernist questions bear either on the ontology 
of the literary text itself or on the ontology of the world which it projects, 
for instance: What is a world?; What kinds of world are there, and how do 
they differ?; What happens when different kinds of world are placed in 
confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds are violated? (McHale 
1987:10)
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Although questioning‘T  and questioning “world” are both equally stressed 
in quotations excerpted from Higgins's A Dialectic o f Centuries: Notes 
towards a Theory o f the New Arts, McHale emphasizes only those aspects 
that concern the world. The ontology of a literary text itself, as well as the 
ontology of a world it projects, in McHale’s terms, are completely 
dependent on an “I” which has to remain untouched in order to be able to 
ask all these questions. This is probably the reason why McHale does not 
notice an interesting contradiction in one of Higgins's questions that he 
cites, namely, what the meaning of “my” is when there are a lot of “selves.” 
It seems that Higgins also maintains a notion of a unified, individual “I” 
which can use “my” even in the question: “Which of my selves is to do it?” 
In this respect, it is possible to say that both Higgins and McHale 
understand postmodernist art and literature in terms of modernist thought, 
as they define it.
The same does not go fo r . Linda Hutcheon's studies of 
postmodernist art and literature. In her books A Poetics o f Postmodernism 
and The Politics o f Postmodernism, Linda Hutcheon focuses on the 
problem of representation in contemporary art and literature. She points out 
that the “parodie art of postmodern” underlines “in its ironic way 
realization that all cultural forms of representation -  literary, visual, aural -  
in high art or the mass media are ideologically grounded, that they cannot 
avoid involvement with social and political relations and apparatuses” 
(Hutcheon 1989: 3), In this regard, “postmodernism works to ‘de-doxify’ 
our cultural representations and their undeniable political import”
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(Hutcheon 1989: 3). Likewise, postmodernist poetics challenges “any 
aesthetic theory or practice that either assumes a secure, confident 
knowledge of the subject or elides the subject completely” (Hutcheon 1988: 
158-159). For that reason, postmodern art and literature do not try to deny 
the “humanist notion of the unitary and autonomous subject,” actually they 
both instal and subvert it (Hutcheon 1988: 159). The notion of the unitary 
and autonomous subject is questioned by placing the discussion of 
subjectivity, inherent in any discursive activity, including their own, into 
the context of both history and ideology (Hutcheon 1988: 159). To 
contextualize the subject, Hutcheon explains, means to situate it, that is, to 
recognize differences of race, gender, class, sexual orientation (Hutcheon 
1988: 159). A result of such contextualization, Hutcheon points out, would 
be Luce Irigaray’s. insight that the “so-called universal and timeless 
humanist subject” is in fact “bourgeois, white, individual, western ‘Man’” 
(Hutcheon 1988: 159).
The two processes -  de-doxifying and contextualization of a subject 
-  cannot be separated from each other. On the contrary, still arguing within 
the framework of feminist thought, Linda Hutcheon claims that “human 
reality, for both sexes, is a construct,” and that “such a view is bound to 
pose problems for traditional humanist notions of the stability of the self 
and of the equation of the self with consciousness” (Hutcheon 1988: 159).
. Postmodern literature foregrounds an awareness that sociality and 
subjectivity are implicated in “the production and reproduction of meaning, 
value and ideology” (Hutcheon 1988: 166). In her analyses and 
interpretations of contemporary fiction, Hutcheon demonstrates how
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postmodern literature questions the established ways of historical , 
representations by dissolving the subject or the “voice” of the narrator who. 
is supposed to be the bearer of the synthetic activity that provides coherence 
and meaning to the story. “On one hand,” writes Hutcheon, “we find overt, 
deliberately manipulative narrators; on the other hand, no one single 
perspective but myriad voices, often not completely localizible in the 
textual universe” (Hutcheon 1988: 160). However, by implying that we 
need to question and undermine the concept of the narrator as a unified 
subject in order to question different types of representations, Hutcheon 
preserves a notion of a hierarchical structure in which the narrator as a point 
of origin dominates the narration and the fictional world created by her or 
him:
The metafictional stress on writing, reading, and interpreting emphasises 
the fact that the gendered subject is where meanings are formed, even 
though meanings are what constitute the subject. (Hutcheon 1988: 166)
It is not clear why Hutcheon emphasizes that “the subject is where 
meanings are formed,” whereas she is aware that “meanings are what 
constitute the subject.” Nevertheless, further in her text she stresses again 
that “subjectivity is a fundamental property of language,” and repeats, after 
Kaja Silverman:
If the speaking subject is constituted in and by language, s/he cannot be 
totally autonomous and in control of her or his own subjectivity, for
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discourse is constrained by the rules of the language and open to multiple 
. connotations of anonymous cultural codes. (Hutcheon 1988: 168)
At this point one would expect at least a brief description and explanation 
of the means by which language constrains the narrator’s discourse and how 
the protagonist is “literally produced” through her or his own and others’ 
discourses (Hutcheon 1988: 169); but Hutcheon does not provide such a 
description. However, her interpretations of postmodern fiction and visual 
arts provide a wide space for further analyses of contemporary fiction, 
concerning particularly the question of how the narrative subject is 
produced through its own and others’ discourses.
u
On now to serious matters. No, not yet. Another of Mahood's yams 
perhaps, to perfect my besotment. No, not worth the trouble, it will come 
at its appointed hour, the record is in position from time immemorial. Yes 
the big words must out too, all be taken as it comes. The problem of 
liberty too, as sure as fate, will come up for my consideration at the pre- 
established moment. (Beckett 1979: 310)
S a m u e l  B e c k e t t ’s “unnamable” speaker foretells this somewhere in the 
middle of his speech. However, although he pledges that he will talk, 
because, after all, it is unavoidable, it is pre-established, and therefore it is 
his fate to talk about it, he does not say a word about liberty until the end of 
his speech. In fact, this utterance is the only one in which he mentions
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liberty. Therefore it is possible to ask: Why does he mention liberty? What 
does he speak about instead of liberty? And who is he, after all? Whichever 
of these questions one chooses to answer, one has to admit that it is not 
possible to give a definite answer. To be precise, it is possible to say that, 
for example, he is an unnamable, undetermined “I,” who speaks about 
anything that comes to his mind, hence about nothing that can be retold in a . 
coherent sequence of events that makes sense; therefore mentioning liberty 
is just a coincidence that cannot be interpreted within an incoherent flow of 
speaker’s words and utterances. Or, one can say that by avoiding to mention 
liberty as something that seems inevitable for him, the speaker in a way 
demonstrates his ability to be free. Yet, is it necessary to write a hundred 
pages to demonstrate this? He could end his speech with the sentences 
quoted to achieve the same effect. Even more, is it necessary to write such a 
long, rather incomprehensible monologue to demonstrate the possibility to 
be free? Finally, is it really possible to read this speech in a way that 
foregrounds the issue of liberty? .
In Postmodernist . Fiction, Brian McHale suggests that The 
Unnamable can be construed as a narrative model of “the discontinuity 
between our own mode of being and that of whatever divinity we may wish 
there were” (McHale 1989: 13). The Unnamable reveals this discontinuity 
by foregrounding “the fundamental ontological discontinuity between the 
fictional and the real” (McHale Ï 989: 13). The Unnamable not only creates . 
characters, McHale construes, “he also tries to imagine himself as the 
character o f someone else” (McHale 1989: 13). “But who?” McHale asks, 
and asserts that “the ultimate creator, the God whom the Unnamable can
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never reach, is of course Samuel Beckett himself * (McHale 1989: 13). 
There is “the unbreachable barrier between the fictional world of the 
Unnamable and the real world which Samuel Beckett shares with us, his 
readers” (McHale 1989: 13). There is ho doubt that McHale can support his 
interpretation by a number of quotations from Beckett’s “fictional world.” 
However, there is one important element that McHale’s interpretation fails 
to explain, namely, who is the Unnamable. Who wants to reach God? In 
fact, McHale explains it in a way that can be seen as an overinterpretation. 
McHale uses the “Unnamable” as any other proper name to mark the 
character of Beckett’s fiction. It is possible to say that McHale presupposes 
two things: first, that there is a determinable speaker of Beckett’s The 
Unnamable; second, that the speaker can be named as the Unnamable 
although it is categorically said that he is unnamable. Thus, McHale 
provides answers to the opening speaker’s questions “Where now? Who 
now? When now?,” in spite of the explicit comment that not only are there 
no answers to these questions, but these questions cannot be asked as such 
(Beckett 1979: 267). The point is that McHale’s answer is too simple: he 
makes an analogy between the Unnamable, on the one hand, and Beckett 
and us, his readers, on . the other, by introducing Beckett into his own 
fictional world and then using him as a firm ground to establish the identity 
of the speaker as something opposed to the author. The fact is that the 
whole speech of the unnamable speaker can be read as his continuously 
repeated effort to establish his own identity that still remains highly vague 
until the end of his speech. In this sense, McHale’s construing of The 
Unnamable does not leave.room for the speaker’s indeterminacy.
However, McHale’s interpretation points out two important aspects 
of Beckett’s text: first, it could be said that the speaker -  whoever or
whatever he is -  tries to “imagine himself as the character”; and, second, it
'
could be said that he tries to reach the world of real existence, the one 
which “Samuel Beckett shares with us, his readers.” In other words, it could 
be said that the speaker wants to establish himself as a character, a subject, 
an “I,” in a way that Beckett and we, his readers, are recognized as subjects 
in a real world. Yet, the unnamable speaker, in spite of McHale’s 
interpretation, does not want to be the same subject as we are -  he wants to 
be recognized as a different one. This is the reason why he should remain 
unnamable, why he resists being named. Any name would define him, force 
him to fit within existing patterns of subjectivity, nullifying thus his 
difference. He claims:
It’s a poor trick that consists in ramming a set of words down your gullet 
on the principle that you can’t bring them up without being branded as 
belonging to their breed. (Beckett 1979: 298)
Thus the question still remains: Who is he? What is he talking about? And 
how come that although he is unnamable, an undetermined “I,” it is 
possible to speak about him as a unified subject?
One of the reasons why it is not easy to answer these questions is 
that we seemingly do not have the appropriate tools to analyze Beckett’s 
fiction. The very term “fiction” implies that we view Beckett’s text as a 
kind of narration. All questions that I have posed here imply that I consider
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the unnamable speaker as a kind of a narrator who tells something that 
probably can be called a story. What makes me read Beckett’s text in this 
way? What causes my impression that, although it seems to be a flow of 
unrelated, incomplete, incoherent words and utterances, this text makes 
sense? Otherwise, it is possible to say that it is much easier to demonstrate 
that Beckett’s The Unnamable is not narrative fiction at all and therefore 
cannot be interpreted as a kind of “fiction.” For example, Shlomit Rimmon-. 
Kenan is explicit: “unless it told a story” a text “would not be a narrative” 
(Rimmon-Kenan 1988: 4). And story should be, Rimmon-Kenan explains 
by relying on Russian formalist Boris Tomashevsky, “a succession of 
events” (Rimmon-Kenan 1988: 2). Further, since it is a narrative, “it 
implies someone who speaks” (Rimmon-Kenan 1988: 3). Thus, to have a 
story we need a succession of events, someone who sees them, and 
someone who speaks about them. The one who sees and the one who 
speaks can be one and the same person. This person is also considered a 
character. “A unified construct called ‘character,’” Rimmon-Kenan 
explains, consists of elements combined “under the aegis of the proper 
name” (Rimmon-Kenan 1988: 39). Having in mind these definitions, we 
can try to read two highly representative excerpts from Beckett’s text:
[...] what confusion, someone mentions confusion, is it a sin, all here is 
. sin, you don’t know why, you don’t know whose, you don’t know against 
whom, someone says you, it’s the fault of the pronouns, there is no name, 
for me, no pronoun for me, all the troubles come from that, that, it’s a 
kind of pronoun too, it isn’t that either, I’m not that either, let us leave all
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. that, forget about all that, it’s not difficult, our concern is with someone, 
or our concern is with something, now we’re getting it, someone or 
something that is not there, or that is not anywhere, or that is there, here, 
why not, after all [...] (Beckett 1979: 372)
[...] if only I could feel something on me, I’ll try, if I can, I know it’s not 
I, that’s all I know, I say I, knowing it’s not I, I am far, far, what does it 
mean, far, ho need to be far, perhaps he’s here [...] (Becket 1979: 372)
Do we have a story here? Is there any succession of events here, or, at least, 
two of them (two is minimum to have succession, although, according to 
Gerald Prince and Rimmon-Kenan, a “minimal story” -  that is, a complete 
story -  should consist “of three conjoined events” [Rimmon-Kenan 1988: 
18])? And who narrates this? Likewise in Booth’s interpretation of Stem’s 
Tristram Shandy, is there any armor -  if we exclude that one of the 
“Unnamable” in McHale’s interpretation -  to protect this “story” from 
falling apart? In Rimmon-Kenan’s terms, answers to these questions are 
likely to be negative. Yet, I still have an impression that the quoted 
Beckett’s lines do make sense. And, I still think that we can read them as a 
story. Why? It seems that there are no answers to these questions within the 
framework of Rimmon-Kenan’s rather normative description of the 
contemporary poetics of narrative fiction.
As far as Beckett’s work is concerned, it seems that in his writings 
on narrative fiction, and particularly in Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, Mikhail Bakhtin provides a better ground for interpretation.
Instead of asking about a succession of events, it is possible to ask, in 
Bakhtin’s terms, whether there is any event in the quoted passages? And the. 
answer is obvious: there is the event of the enunciation. Is there any 
succession? Indeed, there is the succession of words, as well as of 
utterances. What makes the story? The tension between the different and 
mostly opposite meanings of words, as well as of utterances. Furthermore, 
the tension between the different meanings inscribed in one and. the same 
word by repetition. According to Bakhtin, one word denotes different 
concepts within different genres and texts; that is, the word’s meaning is 
changed by the change of context. Yet, this change of context cannot annul 
the previous meanings of the word. On the contrary, all meanings of the 
word are effective to a certain extent in every context. Usually, a context is 
structured to enforce, or establish as the dominant, one among several 
possible meanings of the word. But sometimes it can be structured to 
loosen any constraint and allow free flotation of all meanings of the word. 
The words “confusion” and “sin” in the context of the excerpted passage 
can be read in this way. On the other hand; meanings of the pronouns “that” 
and “I” are changed by their repetition within quoted utterances, and the 
conflict of different and sometimes mutually excluded meanings within the 
nonhierarchical structure of Beckett’s fictional world in a way erases their 
meanings almost completely. For example: What does “I” mean in the 
sequence “I say I, knowing it’s not I”? Whereas there is a contradiction here 
-  the meanings o f ‘T  and “not I” are mutually excluded, for both cannot be 
true and both cannot be false -  it is possible to say that in this utterance the
meaning of the “I" is undecidable as well as that ‘T  does not mean 
anything.
If it is not possible to construe the meaning of the ‘T  in Beckett’s 
text, why do I ask who tells the story? How come I have a notion that 
someone is telling the story of the unnamable? Is it possible to imagine a 
speech without a speaker: just a flow of unrelated words and utterances. 
without an origin and an end? Though it is naive to think that there is a sign 
that does not have a subject (Kristeva 1980: 129), I suppose that something 
like that is possible, but then I would not call that a story. I read The 
Unnamable as a story, which means that I think that the succession of 
utterances and words in the speaker’s speech is coherent, hence makes 
sense. Finally, this means that I see the unnamable speaker as a kind of a 
unified subject who is capable of telling the story. In fact, I claim that the 
seemingly incoherent sequence of words and utterances, that in a way 
undermine each others’ meanings, finally make sense, and that the speaker, 
who refuses to be named and given an identity, hence to be recognized as a 
subject, is finally established as a subject, the different one, by the very 
sequence of words and utterances. The Unnamable is a story of one’s being 
established as a subject. It is possible to construe the sense of the 
succession of the speaker’s words and utterances as a process of forming 
the speaker’s own identity.
At one moment, near the end of the speech, the succession of words 
is interrupted by the sequences of murmurs:
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[...] no need to wish, that’s how it will end, in heart-rending cries, in 
articulate murmurs, to be invented, as I go along, improvised, as I groan 
along, I’ll laugh, that’s how it will end, in a chuckle, chuck, chuck, ow, 
ha, pa. I’ll practice, nyum, hoo, plop, psss, nothing but emotion, bing 
bang, that’s blows, ugh, pooh, what else, oooh, aaah, that’s love, enough, 
it’s.tiring, hee hee [...] (Beckett 1979: 375-6)
How are we to understand this? It seems that Julia Kristeva’s distinction 
between “the semiotic” and “the symbolic” provides a ground for 
construing this excerpt from Beckett’s text. In her essay “A Question of 
Subjectivity,” Kristeva says that she is particularly interested in cases 
similar to that of Beckett’s lines, that is, she is interested in cases in which 
language is pushed to its limits or when it does not function any more. She 
explores those situations in which language, signs of language, or identity 
itself become instable and are put into ‘process’. These are the moments 
when norms break up. This modality or condition of meaning Kristeva calls 
“the semiotic.” She explains that the semiotic is related closely to the pre- 
linguistic states of childhood, when the child imitates and articulates the 
sounds and rhythms of her/his surroundings. On the other side, we have 
another modality or condition of meaning that Kristeva calls “the 
symbolic.” “The symbolic” follows the mirror phase and that is the stage in 
which the individual is enabled to acquire language, to articulate it as it has. 
been given. Movement from “the semiotic” into “the symbolic” is the 
process of “stabilizing the subject.” In the “mirror phase” one recognizes 
one’s own image in a mirror as one’s self-image, but this first self-identity
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is not stable. Stabilization of one’s identity, in “the ideal case,” is 
completed when one becomes capable both of using language in a 
prescribed way and articulating one’s own story. However, it is illusory to 
think that one can assume a fixed identity, since it is made upon one’s first 
self-image which is not real, and which stability is possible only through 
subjection of our desire for the mother, that is, through suppression of 
something that is also a part of one’s self. Regarding this, it is possible to 
say that the only way for one to become a subject, ah “I,” is to get rid of 
. one’s own self, although this “self1 in a way does not exist before the “I.” 
In this sense, the meaning of “I say I, knowing it’s not I” becomes clearer: 
now it is not a contradiction, but a paradox. This utterance is a good 
example of what Kristeva defines as “moments of instability, where 
language, or . the signs of language, of subjectivity itself are put into 
‘process,’” or “the signifying phenomenon for the crisis or the unsettling 
process of meaning and subject” (Kristeva 1980: 125). Thus, “the subject in 
process,” in Kristeva’s terms, is the subject who, through taking into 
account the heterogeneity of language as a double modality of “the 
semiotic” and “the symbolic,” takes into account his/her own heterogeneity, 
his/her “false” identity and his/her suppressed “self.”
In her essay “From One Identity to an Other,” Kristeva explains 
that, althoujgh the symbolic is the “inevitable attribute of meaning, sign, and 
the signified object,” both dispositions, “the semiotic” and “the symbolic,” 
are necessarily presupposed by language as social practice (Kristeva 1980: 
134). Nonetheless, “univocal, rational, scientific discourse” has a tendency
to hide “this undecidable character of any so-called natural language”
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(Kristeva 1980: 135). Poetic language, produced by the “experience of the 
semiotic,” by its rhythms, alliterations, metaphors, metonymies, musicality 
(“oooh, aaah, that’s love, enough”), foregrounds the heterogeneous 
character of language (Kristeva 1980: 135), that is, its undecidableness. 
Yet:
However elided, attacked, or corrupted the symbolic function might be in 
poetic language, due to the impact of semiotic processes, the symbolic 
function nonetheless maintains its presence. It is for this reason that it is a 
language. First, it persists as an internal limit of this bipolar economy, 
since a multiple and sometimes even uncomprehensible signified is 
nevertheless communicated; secondly, it persists also because the. 
semiotic processes themselves, far from being set adrift (as they would be 
in insane discourse), set up a new formal construct: a so-called new 
formal dr ideological “writer’s universe,” the never-finished, undefined 
' production of a new space of significance. (Kristeva 1980: 134-5)
It is not clear, what “a new space of significance” means in terms of a 
language that persists as “an internal limit.” Questioning Kristeva’s concept 
of “the semiotic” in her Gender Trouble, Judith Butler asks: “If the 
semiotic promotes the possibility of the subversion, displacement, or 
disruption of the paternal law, what meanings can those terms have if thé 
Symbolic always reasserts its hegemony?” (Butler 1990: 80). Kristeva 
would probably answer that any creative act is made possible by the 
opening of the norms. But the point is: What is really the result of putting
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the subject in the process? And what does the phrase “opening the norms” 
mean in terms of, again, internal limits? Is “the subject in process” there 
just for the sake of questioning its identity and undermining its stability as a 
subject? What is the purpose of that? Does the subject go through this 
process just to reveal that it can be nothing but “the ‘subject* who emerges 
as a consequence of this repression” and “becomes a bearer or proponent of 
this repressive law” (Butler 1990: 79)? Does one open the norms just to 
reveal that their internal limits cannot be changed? Regarding The 
Unnamable, these questions can be restated as follows: Does the 
unnamable speaker speak just to reveal that he cannot express himself as a 
different subject, that he cannot speak at all “without being branded as 
belonging to their breed”? And if he emerges as a consequence of this 
repression of being branded, does it mean that he becomes a bearer or 
proponent of this repressive law? Is this the reason why he does not speak 
about liberty, but just mentions it in passing? In other words, why do I still 
think that this is a story about the forming of a new identity, or about the 
possibility of being a different subject, or about using words without being 
branded, or about setting oneself free of the repressive law? Namely -  after 
all -  about freedom?
According to Kristeva, “it is impossible to treat problems o f
signification seriously, in linguistics or semiology, without including in
these considerations the subject thus formulated as operating
consciousness" (Kristeva 1980: 131). “A definite subject” “the speaking
subject,” “the subject o f enunciation, " Kristeva claims, “is present as soon
as there is consciousness of signification” (Kristeva 1980: 124). Hence,
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consciousness of signification establishes speaking subjects within the 
frame of the internal limits of pronouncing sentences which conform to the 
rules, to the law, that is, to articulation as it has been prescribed. Thus, in 
Kristèva’s terms, the unnamable speaker cannot avoid being branded as 
soon as he uses words that have been rammed down to his gullet. Still, the 
unnamable speaker states very clearly: .
Someone speaks, someone hears, no need to go any further, it is not he, 
it’s I, or another, or others, what does it matter, the case is clear, it is not 
he, he who I know I am, that’s all I know, who I cannot say11 am, I can’t 
. say anything [...] (Beckett 1979: 370)
Here we have consciousness of signification, and thus we have the subject 
of enunciation, but then, who is he? According to Kristeva, he can be either 
a definite subject or a subject in process. Since it is obvious that he is not a 
definite subject, the unnamable speaker can be, within the framework of 
Kristeva’s theory, only a subject in process. As a subject m process he is 
capable of using, and actually uses, both possibilities of language, “the 
symbolic” as well as “the semiotic,” staying within the frame of its bipolar 
economy. Therefore, although an unstable one, he is still a subject, 
according to Kristeva. But that is exactly what the unnamable speaker 
denies in the quoted utterance: someone speaks, but it is not “he,” nor “I,” 
moreover, it doesn’ t matter. This is an explicit refusal of being defined as a 
subject in a prescribed way. Kristeva’s theory does not. allow such a 
breaking of the norms: the norms can be opened, but not broken. There is
only one solution to understand the unnamable speaker in Kristeva’s terms: 
since the semiotic processes themselves are “far . from being set adrift,” 
. otherwise it “would be an insane discourse,” it turns out that the unnamable 
speaker can be understood only as an insane subject. Indeed, this is one 
possibility. Moreover, the only one, but within a certain framework: within 
the framework of the norms of the repressive law.
Being insane is, of course, one of the possibilities of breaking the 
norms. But does it imply freedom? It is not enough to break the norms. The 
breaking of the norms has to be recognized as a forming of new norms. In 
other words, it is not enough to be different, one has to be recognized as 
different. Is that possible? Does the unnamable speaker accomplish it?
At one moment, the speaker tells us the following story:
They love each other, marry, in order to love each other better, more 
conveniently, he goes to the wars, he dies at the wars, she weeps, with 
emotion, at having loved him, at having lost him, yep, marries again, in 
order to love again, more conveniently again, they love each other, you 
love as many times as necessary, as necessary in order to be happy, he 
comes back, the other comes back, from the wars, he didn’t die at the 
wars after all, she goes to the station, to meet him, he dies in the train, of 
emotion, at the thought of seeing her again, having her again, she weeps, 
weeps again, with emotion again, at having lost him again, yep, goes back 
to the house, he’s dead, the other is dead, the mother-in-law takes him 
down, he hanged himself, with emotion, at the thought of losing her, she 
weeps, weeps louder, at having loved him, at having lost him, there’s a 
story for you; that was to teach me the nature of emotion, what emotion
can do, given favorable conditions, what love can do, well well, so that’s 
. emotion, that’s love, and trains, the nature of trains, and the meaning of 
your back to engine, and guards, stations, platforms, wars, heart-rending 
. cries, that must be mother-in-law, her cries rend the heart as she takes 
down her son, or her son-in-law, I don’t know, it must be her son, since 
she cries, and the door, the house door is bolted, who bolted it, when she 
got back from the station she found the house-door bolted, who bolted it, 
he the better to hang himself, or the mother-in-law the better to take him 
down, or to prevent her daughter-in-law from re-entering the premises, 
there’s a story for you [...] (Beckett 1979: 374)
And then he comments: “[...] the door, it’s the door interests me, a wooden 
door, who bolted the door[...]” (Beckett 1979: 375). One can say that this 
story is at least interesting. And one can ask something about the notions of 
love, emotion, wars, even trains, in this story. But, what about -  the door? I 
suppose one hardly needs to ask anything about the door in this story. Yet, 
that is the only thing that interests the speaker. Why? Almost at the end of 
his speech, the speaker says: “[...] it’s the door, perhaps I am at the door, 
that would surprise me, [...] it’s I now at the door, what door, what’s the 
door doing here, [...]” (Beckett 1979: 381). Can we construe the meaning of 
the door in these utterances? It is possible to say that the door can be the 
metaphor of a border, a kind of a threshold between the two spaces? Can 
we distinguish these spaces? Just before he says that he is interested in the 
door, the speaker recounts: “[.. .] it was to teach me how to reason, it was to 
tempt me to go, to the place where you can come to an end, I must have
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been a good pupil up to a point, I couldn’t get beyond a certain point, I can 
understand their annoyance, [...]” (Beckett 1979: 375). It seems that it is 
possible to equate “a certain point” with “the door.” Regarding this, we can 
distinguish two spaces as follows: there is a place where they are, where 
one is taught how to reason, and where you can come to an end; and there is 
a place where the speaker is. When he says “there is a story for you” it can 
be understood like this: he, from within his space gives the story to “you” 
who are within an other space. Further, it can be understood that he says 
that he'knows how to tell a story, which can come to an end, for those 
“you,” but that is not his story, that is their story. Thus he gives up telling 
this story and starts to talk about the door. That is his story. And this means 
that within each of these two different spaces symbolically divided by the 
door there is a particular kind of story, each, different from the other one.
Something more can be said about these two spaces: they do not 
exist one beside or parallel to the other without any connections and 
exchanges. On the contrary, there is a kind of relation between them -  a 
relation of “annoyance” or, to say, of “abjection.” So it could be said that 
there is a possibility, or rather a tendency that these two places are mutually 
exclusive. But, are they really? I am inclined to understand the relation 
between these two places in terms of Judith Butler’s discussion on the 
“zone of uninhabitability.” The “zone of uninhabitability” is the domain of 
“abject beings” (Butler 1993: 3) And the function of. this “zone of 
uninhabitability” is to “constitute the defining limit of the subject’s 
domain” (Butler 1993: 3). The subject’s domain, or, in Beckett’s words, the 
domain of the breed, is regulated by the norms. Actually, the norms in a
“performative fashion” constitute subjects, and they can be effective as 
performative acts only through reiteration. Thus, one becomes a subject 
through the performative, which becomes effective through reiteration and 
is determined by abjection. Butler asserts:
In this sense, then, the. subject is constituted through the force of 
exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the 
subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, “inside” the subject as its 
own founding repudiation. (Butler 1993: 3)
‘“Inner” and ‘outer,’” Butler explains, “make sense only with reference to a 
mediating boundary that strives for stability” (Butler 1990: 134). The 
“mediating boundary that strives for stability,” or, in Beckett’s words, “the 
door,” is the very boundary between the “outer” of the unnamable speaker 
and “inner” of them to whom he speaks. And this can be said the other way 
around: the “inner” of the unnamable speaker and “outer” of them to whom 
he speaks; because this turning the other way is what the unnamable 
speaker in fact does, or what is done to him. He is established as the subject 
almost in the same way as others are established: through a performative 
reiteration of the norms. The difference is that what is “inner” in the space 
of the unnamable speaker becomes “outer,” and, the other way around, 
what is “outer” becomes “inner.” Therefore it is possible to say that the 
process of constructing the unnamable speaker as a subject within Beckett’s 
fictional world mirrors the process of constructing subjects within the 
framework of norms. What is recognized as a subject within the framework
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of norms becomes abjected within the fictional world of the unnamable 
speaker, and what is abjected by the norms becomes a subject within the 
fictional world by the use of the same procedure. “On their own ground, 
with their own arms, I’ll scatter them, and their miscreated puppets,” the 
unnamable speaker claims (Beckett 1979: 298). The unnamable speaker 
establishes himself as a subject within the “zone of uninhabitability,” or 
within the domain of “abject beings,” by a very simple permutation, or by a 
mere renaming; he simply defines the domain of the subjects as the domain 
of abject beings. And this renaming becomes performative, that is, effective 
through continuous reiteration throughout his speech.
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*  *  *
H o w e v e r , t h e r e  is  r e a s o n  enough to ask what conditions need to be 
fulfilled so that the unnamable narrator's performative acts eventually 
become effective? Is this rebellion of Beckett’s protagonist conducted only 
at the level of speech acts? Unlike § algo’s Anna O., the narrator of The 
Unnamable àots not withdraw into a complete isolation. In his strange way, 
he puts himself in a permanent relation, and interaction With the external 
world of Beckett’s fiction. Yet, is it sufficient for assuming a new identity?
As wè have seen, resistance in the domain of the psyche is doomed 
to failure. So, what is the domain in which there is a possibility for 
successful resistance, powerful enough to change the norms of acceptance 
of new identities? According to the previous discussion, the answer ought 
to be that the body provides the ground for an effective rebellion. In the 
particular case of Beckett’s unnamable narrator it is not only the matter of a 
body in the process of disintegration that could be given “the shape, if not 
the consistency, of an egg, with two holes no matter where to prevent it 
. from bursting, for the consistency is more like that of mucilage” (Beckett 
1979:. 279), or “one-armed one-legged” body, or the “wedge-headed trunk” 
that is just another phase “of the same carnal envelope” (Beckett 1979: 
303), here we are talking about the body that is losing its masculine features 
as well:
The tumefaction of the penis! The penis, well now, that’s a nice surprise, 
I’d forgotten I had one. What a pity I have no arms, there might still be 
something to be wrung from it. No ’tis better thus. (Beckett 1979: 305)
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The sequence of the bodily malfunctions is ended by the complete lost of 
masculinity:
[...] look, here’s the medical report, spasmodic tabes, painless ulcers, I 
repeat, painless, all is painless, multiple softenings, manifold hardenings, 
insensitive to blows, sight failing, heart irregular, sweet-tampered, smell 
failing, heavy sleeper, no erections, would you like some more [...] 
(Beckett 1979: 347)
Such a body cannot serve as a ground for establishing an identity acceptable 
within the framework of the “law.” As soon as the body’s gender is 
questioned, a new identity is about to be formed. This formation of a new 
identity is then possible through the deliberate implementation of 
performative practices of discursive techniques disclosed by parodying 
strategies. “On their own ground, with their own arms,” claims the 
unnamable narrator, foretelling Judith Butler’s insight that the “law” could 
be opposed successfully only by itself.
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6. Conclusion
T h e r e  a r e  t w o  a s p e c t s  of this thesis that I would like to highlight at the 
end. Both aspects are related to some important theoretical issues 
considering methods of interpretation. To explain this, I will start from my 
“interlude” chapter. By construing or playing with David Albahari’s 
extremely short story I wanted to show how important a theoretical 
framework is for understanding even one short sentence presented as a 
story. By changing interpretative contexts I tried to offer several possible 
interpretations that may not be in any obvious or firm mutual relation, and 
yet, at the same time, that do not exclude each other.
On the level of the whole thesis, I did exactly the same: I chose the 
theoretical discussion on subjectivity and identity as the framework for 
construing Judita § algo’s and Samuel Beckett’s novels. At the same time, I 
did with Butler’s theory what I did with the fictional works that I 
interpreted. I chose to understand Butler’s work, within the context of 
Berlin’s, Douglas’s, and Kristeva’s works. I deliberately did not take into 
account Foucault, who is Butler’s main source and point of departure. I
thought that it would be useful to draw parallels between Butler’s 
groundbreaking thoughts, and ideas of some conservative thinkers like 
Berlin and Douglas. Whatever Butler says about the liberal-humanist 
tradition, her insights are heavily directed by that tradition, just as her 
political engagement is deeply inspired by and rooted in the liberal politics 
of human rights and equality.
As far as my interpretations are concerned, I want to foreground my 
“interlude” again. The structure of the “interlude” is as follows: I start with 
a theoretical problem, and then elaborate it by using an appropriate example 
from literature. Indeed, I do not think that by interpreting one short sentence v 
presented as a story, as well as by interpreting a whole novel, I could 
manage to offer the ultimate solution. And that was not my intention, after 
all. What I wanted to demonstrate is that some theoretical problems of 
interpretation of works of literature could be solved within the theoretical 
contexts that are broader than the context of literary criticism itself. For 
example, if we are talking about the features of a narrator or other fictional 
characters, we implicitly or explicitly assume à whole set of definitions of 
what the person, self, or identity is. On the other hand, once we choose a 
broader theoretical framework, we ought to use all of those tools developed 
within literary theory for the purposes of interpretation. Somewhere at the 
beginning of the chapter on Beckett’s The Unnamable I wrote that we could 
not use old-fashioned tools to interpret twentieth-century fiction. However, 
at the end of that chapter it turns out that I manage to interpret The 
Unnamable in terms of “classical” knowledge of literary criticism. And, as I
pointed out in my introduction, I managed to do it by choosing ah 
appropriate, broader theoretical framework.
The issue of identity is of great importance in literature as well as in 
literary criticism. I am inclined to believe that there is no better and more 
obvious example of the construction of identities than those numerous 
works of literary fiction. However, in literary criticism as well as in other 
fields of humanities, an identity is taken to be something pre-given, already 
existing, rather than something formed, produced by and within a given text 
or discourse.
The feminist discussion on the issue of identity, focused mainly on 
the question whether feminist politics heed a firm concept of feminine 
identity, opens a way to the conclusion that every identity accepted within 
and by society is in fact a social or cultural product. This insight eventually 
provides us with an appropriate ground for understanding and interpreting 
works of contemporary literature, and particularly the works of 
contemporary fiction that are usually considered almost unapproachable. I 
chose three literary works of that kind and read them in accordance with the 
chosen theory. The fact that within a certain context I managed to establish 
their meanings not only confirms that the chosen theoretical framework was 
appropriate for interpreting these works, but demonstrates that the theory 
itself functions as a sound explanatory model as well.
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